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SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT MADAGASCAR PRRO 10442.0

**Response to Recurrent Natural Disasters and
Seasonal Food Insecurity**

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Protracted relief and recovery operation 10442.0 replaces a series of relief operations and has two objectives in accordance with the WFP Strategic Plan (2006–2009): i) to protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks; ii) support the improved nutrition and health status of children, mothers and other vulnerable people. The operation comprises two components: immediate relief and assistance and recovery. The first component has two subcomponents: i) disaster preparedness and mitigation in cyclone-risk zones; and ii) reduction of food insecurity in the Grand Sud region during the lean season. Activities include general food distributions, food-for-work and nutritional recovery programmes. The second component aims to protect livelihoods and better prepare people for shocks through food-for-work activities.

The substitution of successive emergency operations by a medium-term protracted relief and recovery operation is a suitable approach given that natural disasters and food insecurity are recurrent phenomena in Madagascar, which has undergone more than 50 disasters since 1970. This approach allows a more rapid and efficient response in the event of a sudden natural disaster and, in theory, interventions before a food crisis develops, in particular in the Grand Sud. As was fitting, the operation was formulated to take into consideration the need to provide immediate support and then proceed to recovery activities.

The design of the protracted relief and recovery operation is relevant in terms of components, targeting and food rations. The pre-positioning strategy enables the rapid delivery of food to any location. However, certain aspects of the project document should have been more explicit: the objectives, while in line with WFP's Strategic Objectives, are too generic and their results difficult to monitor. The second component is not sufficiently developed and its relationship to the country programme is not spelled out. Finally, the hand-over strategy is overly ambitious given the number of capacity-building activities planned for the short duration of the operation. However, the country office was able to propose and apply solutions not envisaged when the project was formulated: borrowing food at the start of the operation, implementing two special operations¹ and carrying out nutritional activities following a cyclone.

After 24 months, the funding level of the operation was US\$18,461,098, or 104 percent of the budget. During this period, food delivered to partners totalled 19,077 mt against the planned amount of 22,898 mt (85 percent), in spite of resources not being received until six months after the operation had begun.

Between July 2006 and June 2008, nine tropical storms or cyclones requiring WFP intervention struck Madagascar. Following each disaster, the country office undertook a rapid needs assessment with its partners and the affected population, and responded appropriately

¹ Special Operation 10664.0 (April–June 2007) and Special Operation 10736.0 (February–May 2008).



and immediately, sometimes provisionally deploying its own staff to provide rapid relief. The country office also supplied food to partners requesting it to complement their own resources. The relief activities were on the whole appropriate in relation to identified needs. As requested by the Government, food-for-work activities quickly and systematically replaced general food distributions. The number of beneficiaries covered by the operation is in line with the recommendations of the post-cyclone assessments.


The recovery phase was limited to delivering short-term solutions. This was because: i) objectives and criteria for this phase were too vague; ii) insufficient funds were allocated for purchasing equipment and supplies, with the country office relying almost exclusively on partners' often limited resources; and iii) partners selected did not always have the skills necessary to provide and manage technical support for the more complex and important food-for-work activities.

WFP partnered with 18 non-governmental organizations, which allowed for effective joint responses to a string of disasters. The partnerships have been mutually appreciated. However, the agreements are piecemeal, limited in scope and duration, while the non-governmental organizations must conform to a host of regulations, mainly dictated by WFP Headquarters and intended for managing activities on a different scale than that of the projects proposed. Non-governmental organizations have expressed regret about the long, laborious and costly process of formulating joint projects. Moreover, all partners and service providers met by the mission² encountered delays in payment.

Another drawback was the lack of a systematic monitoring system and of a coordinator within the country office responsible for monitoring and evaluation. The outcomes and outputs of the operation's two components and subcomponents have not been systematically monitored.

On the whole the operation kept within the approved budget. This positive aspect is a reflection of the care taken in drawing up the budget and cost containment during implementation. However, further savings could be achieved by optimizing logistics and better anticipating indirect costs.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of the "Summary Evaluation Report Madagascar PRRO 10442.0" (WFP/EB.1/2009/7-A) and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

² The evaluation mission met 9 of the 18 NGO partners of the country office.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



INTRODUCTION

1. This report summarizes the conclusions of the evaluation of protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 10442.0, conducted between June and August 2008. Its objectives were: i) to report on activities undertaken and the extent to which their implementation was in line with the original plan; ii) to identify reasons for successes and failures and derive lessons learned; and iii) to contribute to the design of any future operation in Madagascar. Given the innovative nature of this PRRO, the evaluation also sought to: iv) draw lessons from the atypical use of this programme category, which could be replicated in other operations.

GENERAL OVERVIEW

Context

2. Madagascar is a low-income, food-deficit country located off the coast of southeast Africa; it has a population of 19.1 million, of which 73 percent live in rural areas. In 2006 it was ranked 143rd out of 177 countries in the human development index. In recent years the Malagasy economy has grown at an average annual rate of 5 percent, but 69 percent of the population live below the poverty line; per capita income in 2005 was US\$290.
3. Extremely vulnerable to natural disasters, Madagascar has been struck by more than 50 cyclones, floods or droughts since 1970. Chronic food insecurity affects 65 percent of the population and can reach 73 percent during the lean season,³ when nearly 13 percent of children under 5 suffer from malnutrition. The cyclone season coincides with the lean season and is often followed by drought in the south; food insecurity and vulnerability can then become extreme. Vitamin A deficiency is widespread, in particular for mothers. Anaemia affects the entire population, especially preschool children and women of childbearing age.
4. Madagascar has developed a policy and strategy for managing risks and natural disasters with an institutional mechanism for implementing national, regional and local plans. This mechanism comprises a consultative body, the National Agency for Risk and Disaster Management, which involves all ministries and is chaired by the Prime Minister. Its operational arm is the National Office for Risk and Disaster Management (*Bureau national de gestion des risques et des catastrophes* – BNGRC), which: i) supports crisis prevention and mitigation; ii) liaises with regional, district and community management committees; and iii) issues guidance and organizes training.
5. A new national policy calls for establishing an effective social protection system to enable the population to improve its capacity to manage risks and cope with shocks through activities in five priority areas, including disaster prevention and mitigation and increasing the incomes of vulnerable groups.

³ FAO. 2004. Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System.



6. The BNGRC has revitalized the system of sectoral commissions of the Brainstorming Committee on Disasters (*Comité de réflexion des intervenants dans les catastrophes – CRIC*), a national platform for information exchange and coordination between all stakeholders. Chaired by the BNGRC, the CRIC comprises six commissions led by the relevant ministerial department and headed by a United Nations agency. WFP is the lead agency of the logistics and infrastructure commission.
7. In 2007, the United Nations country team adopted a sectoral approach to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. WFP participates in the nutrition and food security cluster and the logistics cluster; the United Nations Theme Group on Disaster Prevention and Management; and the special food security working group set up to address the problem of chronic food insecurity in the Grand Sud. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are important partners.

Description of the operation

8. Rather than continue to respond to disasters through a series of emergency operations (EMOPs), in 2006 WFP drew up a PRRO. Originally foreseen to last 24 months, the operation was extended by 12 months and thus covers the period July 2006 to June 2009. The original cost was US\$13,072,479, of which the food cost was US\$5,249,860. Three budget revisions brought the total budget to US\$29,038,145, of which the food cost was US\$14,202,172. There were 337,500 beneficiaries per year until June 2008 and 333,500 for the third year. Budget revisions increased the quantity of food from 18,348 mt to 32,859 mt.
9. The PRRO has two objectives, in line with the WFP Strategic Plan 2006–2009: i) to protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks; and ii) support the improved nutrition and health status of children, mothers and other vulnerable people.
10. The operation is structured around two components: “immediate assistance and relief” and “recovery”. The first comprises two subcomponents: i) disaster preparedness and mitigation in cyclone-risk areas; and ii) mitigation of food insecurity during the lean season in the Grand Sud. The second component aims to protect the livelihoods of the local population and better prepare for shocks through food-for-work (FFW) activities. Activities include general food distributions, FFW and nutritional rehabilitation programmes.
11. The hand-over strategy provides for strengthening the capacity of partners to evaluate, coordinate and manage future emergencies.
12. The PRRO complements the 2005–2009 country programme (10334.0), which comprises the following activities: i) support to basic education; ii) food security, disaster mitigation and protection of the environment; and iii) support for the fight against malnutrition, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.



Methodology

13. The evaluation team comprised a rural development expert, a logistics expert and an adviser on disaster risk reduction. Methodology involved reviewing documents and drafting a preliminary report prior to the mission. Work continued in Madagascar to further study the documentation and interview WFP colleagues and numerous partners in Antananarivo and in the field.
14. In order to study the greatest possible variety of situations, field visits covered: i) the Grand Sud, especially the Androy Region; ii) the cyclone-risk areas – Fenerive-Est and l'Île Sainte-Marie (Cyclone Ivan) and Antalaha (Cyclone Indlala); iii) the port areas of Tulear and Tamatave; and iv) a pre-positioning site at Antalaha. Beneficiaries were consulted along with main cooperating partners.
15. The evaluation encountered the following constraints: i) absence of many informants who were on leave; ii) the staff restructuring in the country office, which affected people in important posts and made transmission of information more difficult; iii) a simultaneous review of country office activities, requested by WFP management; and iv) the scarcity of comparable, high-quality monitoring data.
16. To improve the quality and coherence of evaluations, WFP's Office of Evaluation set up an Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) based on the norms and standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group and good practices adopted by the international community. The mission did its best to adhere to the EQAS.

MAIN RESULTS

Relevance and design

17. The relevance of the underlying assumptions, objectives, components and subcomponents of the PRRO (including the food pre-positioning strategy) became clear when the island was struck by nine cyclones or storms between 2006 and 2008, and the Grand Sud suffered a major food crisis in 2006/07. The targeting of geographical areas and beneficiaries was correctly conceived given that children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women suffering from moderate malnutrition were the categories identified as vulnerable in the recent government social protection policy and the 2005 comprehensive food security and vulnerability assessment.
18. Rations are nutritionally adequate and correspond to local dietary habits, based mainly on rice. Family rations are provided for adults accompanying children in the intensive nutritional rehabilitation centres and the supplementary feeding centres in order to prevent the dilution of the child's ration within the home.
19. The number of beneficiaries provided for under the PRRO is an indicative number since the operation aims to assist persons who could potentially become vulnerable following a disaster. The number is thus the result of an extrapolation on the basis of historical trends rather than an assessment of the actual number of persons to be assisted. The estimate of 337,500 a year proved accurate overall in view of the crises that struck the country between 2006 and 2008. The country office adopted an appropriate strategy by planning for a modest number of beneficiaries, with the option of increasing it through a budget revision if necessary.



20. Certain aspects of the project document should have been more explicit: the objectives, while in line with WFP's Strategic Objectives, are too generic and their results are difficult to monitor; the recovery component is extremely vague. The relationship between the PRRO and the country programme is not spelled out, although both aim at improved food security and disaster mitigation. Finally, the hand-over strategy is overly ambitious given the short duration of the operation.
21. However, the country office was able to propose and apply solutions not envisaged during project formulation, including: i) borrowing food when implementation began; ii) distributing sorghum in the Grand Sud to support reintroduction of the crop by certain partners; iii) implementing two special operations; and iv) a few months after a cyclone, launching nutritional activities not planned initially.

Inputs, outputs, outcomes: Elements of efficiency

22. **Inputs.** After 24 months, the funding level of the PRRO was US\$18,461,098 or 104 percent of the budget,⁴ indicating excellent resource mobilization. The United States of America, the European Union, Canada, Norway and the Netherlands were among the main donor countries. The Central Emergency Response Fund contributed to implementation of the PRRO with US\$2 million, or 11 percent of the total; 16 percent of financing was from other multilateral funds.
23. A total of 19,077 mt of food commodities, out of a planned 22,899 mt (85 percent), was delivered to partners. Some 785,500 beneficiaries were assisted, which was more than the planned number. However, the first commitments were not confirmed until six months after the launch of the operation. This meant that the number of beneficiaries in 2006 was very low, just when a serious food crisis was developing in the Grand Sud. If the country office had not resorted to borrowing food commodities, none of the PRRO activities would have been carried out during the first six to eight months.
24. Within the framework of the subcomponent "disaster preparedness and mitigation in cyclone-risk areas", the country office pre-positioned food for the two cyclone seasons: i) in 2006/7, 717 mt (borrowed from the country programme) in seven locations, with four partners; and ii) in 2007/08, 715 mt in six locations, with three partners. The volume of pre-positioned commodities (about 100 mt of cereals and 15 mt of pulses per site) is appropriate since it makes it possible to assist about 20,000 persons during the two or three weeks following a cyclone while at the same time organizing any further relief operations if needed. The pre-positioning sites (on the east coast, with Majungha on the west coast) are an appropriate choice given: i) the frequency of cyclones in those areas; and ii) the presence of partners with extensive operational capacity and adequate storage capacity. In areas where partners have their own resources, the country office did not pre-position food.
25. The quantity of food and the choice of pre-positioning sites were appropriate. Because the pathway of cyclones is totally unpredictable, the country office was right in considering the best approach to be to situate smaller stocks at some advance sites while maintaining larger stocks in its own warehouses. When there were no cyclones, partners were expected to undertake FFW activities to improve disaster preparedness and mitigation. There are few examples of the use of commodities for FFW activities that had a real effect on disaster preparedness and mitigation. Worth noting are the planting of 196,000 mangrove

⁴ As of 5 September 2008. Figures from the External Affairs and Resource Development Department.



saplings and the installation of 122,000 windbreaks along the Antalaha coast to protect the region from rising tides and the advancing of the sea, which are useful measures to enhance the resilience of inhabitants.

26. Even though the pre-positioned stocks were often limited, their use when there was no cyclone was not optimized for the following reasons: i) not all partners seemed to have agreed to carry out FFW activities when there was no cyclone; ii) certain partners can support emergency distributions, but are less equipped to carry out more significant FFW activities; and iii) some partners criticized the lack of continuity between pre-positioning and the launching of FFW activities, which requires a Letter of Understanding that often takes a long time to get approved. As of August 2008, no Letter of Understanding for the use of 2007/08 pre-positioned stocks had been signed.⁵
27. Between July 2006 and June 2008, nine tropical storms or cyclones requiring WFP intervention struck Madagascar. Following each disaster, the country office regularly undertook a rapid needs assessment with its partners and the affected population, and immediately delivered appropriate responses, sometimes by provisionally redeploying its own personnel to speed up relief operations. The country office also supplied food to partners who requested it to complement their own resources. Emergency relief measures were on the whole appropriate in relation to assessed needs. As requested by the Government, general food distributions were replaced quickly and systematically by FFW activities to rehabilitate community assets and restore damaged agricultural and other infrastructure. The number of beneficiaries covered by the PRRO is correct because it is in line with the figures proposed by each post-cyclone assessment bearing in mind that the original project document figures were only working projections.
28. In addition, the country office supported the National Nutrition Office (*Office national de nutrition*) and UNICEF in confronting an alarming nutritional situation in Fenerive-Est following Cyclone Ivan in 2008. Several months after the disaster, a Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) revealed that the situation required rapid intervention. Although such a situation was not foreseen in the project document, the country office took the initiative to support its partners in launching a nutritional project.
29. For the subcomponent “mitigation of food insecurity during the lean season”, the country office based itself on data from the early warning system (EWS) and on the rural information and food security information system (*Système d'information rurale et de sécurité alimentaire* – SIRSA) to determine whether an operation was necessary. Food security monitoring sentinel sites projected for regions not covered either by EWS or SIRSA were not set up, partly because of the Government’s decision to establish a national system to supply the same type of information.
30. In 2006, limited resources severely curtailed the possibility of reaching persons affected by the food crisis in the south. Through borrowing, the country office undertook FFW and nutritional support activities and about 36,200 beneficiaries received 482 mt of food, considerably less than required. Better resourced in 2007, the country office expanded its assistance in the Grand Sud in line with EWS recommendations.
31. **Recovery.** The FFW activities were often short-lived, temporarily reducing food insecurity rather than contributing to a real recovery. Reasons for this include: i) extremely

⁵ Despite the lack of a Letter of Understanding, some partners had already initiated FFW activities in August 2008.



vague objectives and criteria for the recovery phase; ii) shortage of funds for acquiring equipment and supplies, with the country office relying almost exclusively on partners' often limited resources; and iii) partners selected did not always have the skills necessary to provide and technically manage more complex and important FFW activities.

32. **Logistics.** The PRRO uses the standard transport chain including overside delivery, port transit, commercial and customs formalities, storage in WFP warehouses, organization of primary and secondary transport and delivery to partners. On the whole, the logistics system is set up correctly, the choice of sites of the two main warehouses (Tamatave and Tulear) is good and the organization of transport to areas served is appropriate given the logistical complexities of Madagascar;⁶ and it is in line with WFP systems. However, the system does not always allow for a fast enough adjustment of the storage capacity required, which explains why storage capacity tends to exceed requirements.
33. Late arrival of shipping documents and the slow pace of customs formalities have resulted in considerable demurrage charges, but the country office has managed to clarify customs clearance procedures and get shipping companies to adjust their free periods.

Monitoring and Evaluation

34. A major shortcoming is the absence of a systematic monitoring and evaluation system (including for example checklists and schedules of field monitor visits) and of a coordinator responsible for monitoring and evaluation. The results of the specific activities under the PRRO's two components and two subcomponents were not thoroughly monitored; more rigorous monitoring would generate information to help better understand the difficulties encountered and modify implementation accordingly.
35. Finally, although in theory the country office requires every partner to provide a final report with quantitative and qualitative data for each project, in reality very few reports were submitted. The few examples the mission was able to consult were useful for showing the positive gains, limits and negative effects of the work undertaken.
36. **Partnerships.** Relations between WFP and the Government are governed by a basic agreement signed on 3 July 1968. PRRO 10442.0 is the subject of a Letter of Understanding signed on 26 July 2006 with the Ministry of the Interior; WFP ensures the coordination of operations and activities with the BNGRC.
37. WFP works with 18 international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), allowing it to react effectively with its partners to a string of disasters that occurred during the PRRO. However, the partnership with NGOs is fragmented. In two years, more than 80 Letters of Understanding were signed; 60 percent were for less than 200 mt. The country office explained that such an approach was necessary for budgeting reasons and because Headquarters procedures required differentiating activities in accordance with their cost structures. NGOs are required to conform to a range of measures mostly determined by WFP Headquarters, which are disproportionate to the scope of the contracts or projects proposed under this type of operation. While the NGOs appreciate their partnership with WFP, they unanimously criticized the long, laborious and costly formulation stage.

⁶ Large size, difficult access even under normal conditions, and the effects of natural disasters that can make much of the country inaccessible.



38. Administrative loads led to delays in payment of services rendered; all the NGOs met with² reported settlement delays of between 6 and 18 months. They found it difficult to comply with WFP's numerous instructions and demands for supporting documentation and often the paperwork they submitted was either incomplete or inaccurate. The country office is aware of the problem and is working to remedy it. Training on this topic was organized in April 2008 and there has been a slight improvement recently.
39. **Budget.** On the whole the authorized budget has been respected. This positive aspect is a reflection of the care taken in drawing up the budget and good cost control. Staff is extremely attentive to costs during budget preparation, award of transport or handling contracts and the settlement of invoices. However, further savings could be achieved by optimizing logistics (monitoring port transit operations, customs clearance and disbursement of internal transport, storage and handling payments) and better anticipating indirect costs.
40. **Transfer of capacities.** The country office has transferred capacities and responsibilities to the Malagasy Government and this should continue.

Results

41. As regards results achieved in relation to the two objectives, indicators used in the standard project report suggest the following:
- The expenditures devoted to purchase of food (the indicator used to measure protection of livelihoods) have declined slightly, from 70 to 64 percent.
 - The 2007 standard project report states that results indicators such as those measured by SMART surveys seem to indicate an improvement in the nutritional status of children under 5, with the rate of acute malnutrition declining from 20.4 to 10.3 percent.
42. However, it should be noted that the type of indicators used is questionable, as they are too general and influenced by too many factors.
43. The scarcity of comparable and high-quality data means that results are anecdotal. The few examples below do however give a sense that there is potential for recovery.
44. The operation in the Sofia area in 2007/08 involved the rehabilitation and construction of irrigation ditches, tracks and retainer walls and made possible:⁷
- an average of 50 percent increase in arable land, and nearly 184 percent increase in yields;
 - improved access to markets for local products, which stimulated production; and
 - stabilization of the price of rice even during the lean season, along with preservation of assets.
45. Moreover, the BNGRC and UNICEF both replicated the pre-positioning strategy for food and non-food items.
46. As regards the operation during the lean season between January and May 2007, CARE reports tracks being maintained through FFW activities. The impact was reflected in three areas – food security, local development and economic development – and specifically:

⁷ Source: WFP. 2008. *FFW activities – Sofia region, October 2007–January 2008*. Antananarivo.



- The activities reduced food shortages among the poorest households as evidenced by a reduction in infant mortality.
 - The improvement in roads prompted an NGO to go and work in a rural community and school feeding was boosted.
 - The rehabilitated tracks facilitated the buying and selling of agricultural products.
47. The distribution of 4,000 mt of sorghum in the Grand Sud through FFW activities is worth mentioning. It contributed to protecting seeds distributed by other partners and supported the strategy to reintroduce the crop, which had almost disappeared following previous droughts.

Cross-Cutting Issues: The Gender Issue

48. WFP pays special attention to women, who are a particularly vulnerable group during food crises. The country office has adequately reflected WFP policy by giving priority to pregnant and lactating women and women heads of household. Women also play a leading role in FFW and food distribution management committees. Finally, certain FFW activities are particularly beneficial to women, in particular the creation of rainwater reservoirs and the deepening of ponds, which lighten the burden of water collection.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall assessment

49. From the outset, the country office faced a difficult situation, due in part to late arrival of initial funding. However, it adapted by borrowing commodities, implementing two special operations and carrying out post-cyclone nutritional activities not foreseen during project design.
50. Improvements in relationships with partners have recently become apparent.
51. Some issues, however, call for more effort. While some needed improvements are the responsibility of the country office, others require the attention of WFP Headquarters and the regional bureau in Johannesburg.

Considerations for the future

52. In the light of the Madagascar experience, WFP Headquarters should decide to:
- extend the use of medium-duration PRROs in situations of recurrent natural disasters to enable a more rapid and efficient response in such cases; integrate recovery within the emergency response phase and extend it for a sufficient length of time, and implement prevention activities on a larger scale than that of emergency operations.
 - simplify and streamline administrative procedures for country offices and their partners (approval of project proposals submitted by partners, payment authorization),⁸ because the procedures are a serious administrative burden requiring significant resources in terms of staff and time, involving a cost that WFP will ultimately have to

⁸ This observation applies to WFP operations in every area.



bear. This is especially true for small country offices like Madagascar's, which faces an almost impossible task: to act with speed and flexibility while complying with complex procedures that make sense only in contexts involving far greater resources.

- allow country offices to develop their own outcome indicators specific to each operation, rather than reporting directly on WFP Strategic Objectives. Strategic Objectives should be considered to be goals, reported on through impact indicators.

Recommendations

53. The project document of any future PRRO, especially the content of the recovery component, should be improved, as should the way the PRRO is integrated into development activities (country programme or other) and the hand-over strategy.
54. FFW activities should continue to be run jointly within the PRRO and the country programme, while ensuring that: i) all FFW activities, whether of the country programme or the PRRO, are managed in a consistent manner so as to ensure continuity with cooperating partners and favour the transition from the recovery phase to medium-term development; ii) the country office consider increasing funds allocated to other direct operational costs (ODOC) and guarantees a basic level of non-food inputs for use in FFW activities. This implies choosing partners that also have their own resources or complementary ones, or, when that is not possible, increasing the ODOC budget line for partners with limited complementary resources.
55. The country office should be involved for the transition phase of making the EWS operational, until it becomes part of an official Malagasy institution. At the same time, it should continue to support the BNGRC to get the national early warning system (NEWS) working.
56. Cost savings should be sought by: i) studying the possibility of sub-contracting the management of WFP's main warehouses to a third party and/or introducing a sub-contracting system whereby WFP would only pay for storage on the basis of real volume recorded daily; ii) improving communications between the Headquarters' Shipping Branch and shipping lines or shipping agents in order to obtain preferential treatment for container contracts; and iii) accelerating the disbursement of internal transport, storage and handling funds paid by the regional bureau in Johannesburg.
57. Monitoring of outputs and outcomes must be improved immediately. The evaluation mission recommends that the country office attempt to acquire special funds, for example from trust funds, to finance such an essential improvement, from the design of an integrated system through to implementation. The evaluation of results – the degree to which objectives have been achieved – should be based on a comparison between: i) joint assessments to establish the amount of damage and risks immediately after a disaster; and ii) regular monitoring linked to systematic ex-post evaluations.
58. A staff member should be designated as responsible for monitoring and ensure that the field monitors have checklists and monitoring plans. S/he should also ensure that data is captured in relation to the objectives and specific components of the PRRO.
59. The quality of partnerships should be improved, based on principles clearly formulated and promptly communicated to partners. The recently adopted communications and transparency mechanisms should be promoted and replicated. The country office and its partners should also pursue their joint efforts to reduce payment delays.
60. The successive phases of a single project should be brought together under a single Letter of Understanding, with the country office being able to launch the follow-up phase



of a project by means of a simple e-mail or written communication. This would lighten the administrative load of the country office and its partners, reduce waiting time and make management of activities easier. Instead of functioning in fits and starts, operations could be implemented with a medium- and longer-term view.



LIST OF ACRONYMS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT

BNGRC	<i>Bureau national de gestion des risques et des catastrophes</i> (National Office for Risk and Disaster Management)
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CRIC	<i>Comité de réflexion des intervenants dans les catastrophes</i> (Brainstorming Committee on Disasters)
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department
EMOP	emergency operation
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
EWS	early warning system
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFW	food for work
NGO	non-governmental organization
ODOC	other direct operational costs
OEDE	Office of Evaluation (WFP)
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
SIRSA	<i>Système d'information rurale et de sécurité alimentaire</i> (Food Security and Rural Information System)
SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund