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EVALUATION REPORTS

Agenda item 7

For consideration

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal point indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

Director, Office of Evaluation Ms C. Heider tel.: 066513-2030

Should you have any questions regarding matters of dispatch of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact Ms I. Carpitella, Administrative Assistant, Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Evaluation Findings

This report presents an analysis of 19 evaluations: 3 strategic evaluations, 2 country portfolio evaluations and 14 operations evaluations, of which 4 were conducted by country offices.

The evaluations found WFP's work to be well aligned with government policies, WFP strategies and people's needs, but more needed to be done to ensure WFP was strategically placed to ensure the greatest effectiveness and efficiency of its assistance. The combination of the absence of country strategies; complex programme design with too many diverse activities; and a lack of integration of activities within operations, at country level and of corporate initiatives made it more difficult to exercise strategic choices. In addition, analytical capacity, which is required to inform decision-making and actions, is afforded insufficient resources.

The evaluations demonstrated WFP's strong capacity to scale up and respond rapidly to changing demands in case of emergencies. However, they also illustrated challenges when the changing context required scaling down, a shift in WFP's role and different response strategies as people, communities and countries made transitions from emergency situations toward recovery.

The evaluations found WFP performed well in general food distribution – to meet the needs of people in times of crises – and in the education sector, where school feeding had often provided an additional incentive to improve education outcomes (increased enrolment and attendance and lower drop-out rates). Nutrition programmes demonstrated positive results, but evaluations also observed that indicators were affected by many more factors than WFP food distributions, which makes it more difficult to attain or sustain outcomes. Food-for-assets programmes, while showing some positive outcomes, were the weakest.


Evaluations often found that shortcomings in programme implementation and results could be traced back to resource issues and the funding model. At Headquarters, achievements were made thanks to extra-budgetary contributions to improve contingency planning or needs assessments, but resources were not always available to carry through necessary activities. At country level, a tonnage-based funding model does not provide resources to underpin country strategies or programme design with the necessary analytical work, creates incentives to develop high-tonnage responses, and has rendered programme designs overly optimistic when funding levels could not be achieved. Efficiency and learning across operations were not always guaranteed, as people were hired and worked on specific operations.

WFP's partnerships were generally found to be strong. The evaluations highlighted the importance of working in partnership, which with the United Nations agencies was easier at national level, and with government and non-governmental organization partners was stronger in the delivery of assistance. The capacity of partners was not always strong – a function of the difficult terrain in which WFP operates – and this affected programme delivery and monitoring.

Evaluation at WFP

During 2008–2009, the Office of Evaluation delivered over 75 percent of its work plan. Shortfalls were largely owing to delays resulting from staff turnover and funding shortages in 2007, which had a follow-on effect in 2008. In terms of human resources, staffing levels were maintained but the number of professional evaluators increased. Further investments were made in evaluation quality assurance, sharing of lessons and skills development.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Annual Evaluation Report 2009” (WFP/EB.A/2010/7-A) and the management response in WFP/EB.A/2010/7-A/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

INTRODUCTION


1. This is the second Annual Evaluation Report (AER) to be presented as a formal document to the Executive Board. The 2008 AER provided a synthesis of issues derived from policy evaluations that the Office of Evaluation (OE) had undertaken in the previous two years. These findings stimulated discussions among the Board and senior staff at WFP that in turn resulted in an improved policy-making process.
2. The report is structured in two main parts. “Evaluation Findings” provides a synthesis of the evaluations completed in 2009, including overall conclusions and recommendations on that basis. “Evaluation at WFP” provides an overview of the efforts made to continuously improve WFP’s evaluation system.

EVALUATION FINDINGS

Strategic Evaluations

3. During the 2008–2009 biennium, the strategic evaluations undertaken by OE focused on the “front end” of WFP’s work – namely preparedness for emergencies and information systems – that ensures adequate programme responses and WFP readiness to assist in the right way and recovery assistance that should ensure an increase in people’s resilience to future shocks through livelihood development. The evaluations were focused on these dimensions at a time when the Board and senior management discussed the extent to which WFP should include activities beyond its core business of responding to emergencies. Figure 1 shows a simplified overview of the links between preparedness work, information systems and recovery assistance. It includes, on the recovery side, a much wider definition of recovery than is applicable to WFP’s assistance.

Figure 1: Overview “From Preparedness to Recovery”



4. The three strategic evaluations carried out by OE in 2008–2009 were: “Summary Report of the Strategic Evaluation of WFP’s Contingency Planning (2002–2008)” (WFP/EB.2/2009/6-A); “Summary Report of the Joint Thematic Evaluation of FAO and WFP Support to Information Systems for Food Security” (WFP/EB.1/2010/7-B); and “Summary Report of the Strategic Evaluation of the Effectiveness of WFP Livelihood Recovery Interventions” (WFP/EB.A/2009/7-B). The areas covered by these evaluations are highlighted in blue and indicated with an asterisk in Figure 1. In order to be manageable, the evaluations focused on a narrower set of activities within preparedness and within WFP’s recovery work. As a joint evaluation with FAO, the evaluation of information systems covered needs assessments relevant to more than just WFP’s emergency responses. The AER focuses on the issues relevant to the model in Figure 1 and is not all-inclusive of the findings of the evaluations.
5. **Rationale.** The rationale for the work in all three areas – contingency planning, information systems and livelihoods recovery – is to enable WFP to respond better to crises and for people to be more resilient to shocks. In the case of contingency planning and information systems, the drivers behind improved WFP capacities were donor initiatives about ten years ago. Work on contingency planning was part of a larger initiative supporting a shift towards a pro-active mindset, while work on information systems was motivated by the need for improved credibility of needs assessments.
- The evaluation found that *contingency planning* was well known as a concept and in practice, although in WFP there is a wide range of interpretations of its meaning. The evaluation also identified the dilemma between contingency planning being mandatory, at the risk of it being treated as merely a bureaucratic requirement, or optional, in which case it might not get done. Either way the rationale for contingency planning – to be better prepared in case of an emergency – would not have been well served.
 - The rationale for better *information systems* at WFP is founded on the need for making better decisions about how to fund requirements and how to programme use of funds. The evaluation found that WFP’s work in this area was relevant to decision-making processes in and beyond WFP. The fact that information was collected to inform decision-making was well understood, but how to ensure that information was used was less understood. This was partly because information users – internal and external – and their diverse needs were not fully differentiated.
 - The evaluation of *livelihood recovery interventions* found that WFP had the right policies in place. However, in practice relief work was prioritized and the important work of recovering livelihoods to increase the resilience of people to future shocks was not fully implemented. None of the country case studies demonstrated the development of recovery strategies – which could have demonstrated how the recovery objective would be achieved – as foreseen in WFP’s policy paper “From Crisis to Recovery”.¹
6. **Integrating the parts.** To create positive synergies between contingency planning, information systems and recovery work in relation to emergency responses, a certain degree of integration between the various parts would seem useful. The evaluations observed a number of areas in which better integration could be achieved. The consequence of fragmentations in these various areas is that elements from contingency

¹ WFP/EB.A/98/4-A

planning and needs assessments are not fully taken up in preparing for an emergency or the response, and that planned responses to recovery needs are insufficient.

- The evaluation of *contingency planning* found the various measures of preparedness were not well integrated into an overall system. Instead, it noted a confusing profusion of preparedness requirements – business continuity planning, risk analysis, contingency planning and pandemic planning – that stretched the resources of country offices and did not result in comprehensive preparedness. A link between contingency planning and regular planning, such as annual work plan preparation, was missing.
- The evaluation of *information systems* showed that WFP had a well-integrated system of various information products with distinct purposes. However, a number of stakeholders called for information systems and analyses that integrate various data sets to generate more informative, comprehensive insights into food security issues. The use of WFP information products was found to be good, but the link between the analyses and programming and funding decisions could still be improved.
- The evaluation of *livelihood recovery interventions* found that needs assessments did take into account livelihood models to analyse recovery issues, but that this information was not informing programme design. In particular, the measures included in project designs were found to be insufficient to attain livelihood recovery: they focused on delivery of food for work (FFW) rather than being designed to support the creation of livelihoods. Even if FFW activities were to be implemented in full and successful, they may not achieve their livelihood objectives.

7. **Responding to (changing) needs.** The evaluations analysed the extent to which WFP's work in these three areas helped the Programme to be more responsive to requirements. The association of contingency planning, information systems and livelihood recovery with emergency responses implies that these activities prepare for or take place in rapidly changing contexts. Therefore adaptation and responsiveness are vital.

- The evaluation found that *contingency planning* had increased preparedness in a number of cases, even though evidence was insufficient to demonstrate improved responses as a result. It did assert that the responsiveness of country teams depended on the way in which contingency planning was undertaken: if done as a team exercise, together with partners, it resulted in better partnerships and understanding of potential scenarios and thus readied individuals and teams to respond better when an emergency occurred. When contingency planning was undertaken simply to produce a plan it was less effective, because the necessary networks were not built and the shift in mind-set not achieved.
- The responsiveness of *information systems* to needs is manifested in their ability to rapidly generate reasonably accurate analyses to inform decision-making on time. The evaluation found that emergency food security assessments were undertaken in a timely manner and helped response decisions. However, the existing information systems were not able to predict unexpected events that were not previously experienced.
- During recovery, responsiveness is shown by the ability to adapt to changing needs over time, because needs change as individuals, households and communities go through a recovery process. The evaluation found that *livelihood recovery assistance* was less responsive to such changing needs, partly because of gaps in the system to monitor changing needs, partly because of the inputs available to WFP (primarily FFW), and partly because of the low implementation rate of FFW activities.

8. **Results.** The evaluations were not able to establish a clear link between these three areas and changes in emergency responses. It is difficult to *prove* that contingency planning resulted in better emergency responses because of the many other factors that affect the emergency response. Demonstrating a causal or plausible connection between the activities to improve readiness to respond and the actual response is not tenable.
9. The evaluation of information systems aimed to understand whether decisions were better informed and concluded that information was used, without assessing whether decisions were more appropriate. The evaluations did conclude that the investments in both preparedness and information were necessary, because lack of either certainly risked making weaker responses to emergencies.
10. The evaluations also found factors, some of which were under WFP's control, that limited the impact of: i) contingency planning and information systems on emergency responses; and ii) livelihood recovery interventions on people's resilience. These factors illustrated a gap in follow-through: requirements for preparedness identified in contingency planning were not met, or data and analyses were not consistently used in decision-making, or the implementation of livelihood interventions suffered from poor funding, and therefore operations were scaled back and resources spread too thin.

Country Portfolio Evaluations

11. OE introduced country portfolio evaluations (CPEs) in the 2008–2009 biennium. The Management Plan (2008–2009) ² indicated that these evaluations would inform strategic decision-making by country and regional directors covering all activities and operations during a given timeframe. CPEs are intended to analyse the internal coherence of the full spectrum of WFP's work, including strategic choices and synergies among operations in a country, and evaluate the performance and results of operations.
12. The CPEs completed in 2009 and included in this AER are of WFP's portfolios in the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Malawi. Both evaluations covered operations implemented over the period 2000–2008, and are summarized in Table 1. Details are provided in Tables A.II.1 and A.II.2 in Annex II.

TABLE 1: COUNTRY PORTFOLIOS 2000–2008 BY PROGRAMME TYPE		
	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Malawi
CPs	-	2
DEVs	4	2
EMOPs	2	6
PRROs	2	3
SOs	-	-
Total	8	13

CP: country programme; DEV: development project; EMOP: emergency operation;
PRRO: protracted relief and recovery operation; SO: special operation

² WFP/EB.2/2007/5-A/1

13. CPEs address the following **three** questions which are reported on in the sections below:
- Did WFP align itself with government and partner strategies and position itself strategically in that context?
 - What factors have driven the choices of the current portfolio, and how should the factors be managed, if at all?
 - How did the WFP portfolio as a whole perform and what results did it produce?

⇒ *Alignment and strategic positioning*

14. **Alignment and coordination with governments.** Both evaluations found that WFP was well aligned with government plans and systems. WFP worked fully in the context of existing systems and supported governments in achieving their objectives. This alignment was discernible in the participation in government-led processes such as the aid coordination round tables in Lao People's Democratic Republic or the government structures for responding to emergencies in Malawi. WFP worked through existing government institutions, while providing strong support through its own system of sub-offices in each of the two countries. WFP also aligned its programmes with government policies and strategies, which provided frameworks that were broad enough to facilitate alignment. It contributed to strengthening the governments' policy and institutional frameworks in areas relevant to its mandate, which created the necessary context for alignment. However, alignment did not guarantee strategic positioning, for instance in the Lao People's Democratic Republic where opportunities to use WFP assistance more strategically were not fully realized.
15. **Responding to changing needs.** The CPEs reconfirmed WFP's capacity to respond rapidly to emergency situations by scaling up – significantly in the case of Malawi – and responding to needs as they arise. However, the CPE in Malawi also highlighted that the reverse adjustment in roles was less easily achieved: as the country moved from emergency into recovery mode, WFP found it difficult to adjust its role in the post-emergency transition in the light of changing government and partner expectations. These fundamentally changing needs would have required rethinking the role and programme in a completely different context. Analytical and strategic capacity for such repositioning was not at the disposal of the country office.
16. **Alignment and coordination with partners.** In both countries WFP is part of the United Nations country team (UNCT) and participated in the preparation of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Therefore, WFP operations are well embedded in these frameworks, which provide a platform for cooperation. In addition to such alignment in planning documents, the evaluations observed examples of positive synergies in the delivery of assistance. One such case was the education sector in the Lao People's Democratic Republic, where school feeding took place in schools that were also assisted by the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). However, alignment in planning does not guarantee coordinated delivery at the field level.
17. **Alignment with WFP policies and strategies.** Both evaluations showed that the portfolios in each country were well aligned with WFP's corporate priorities. The objectives of operations matched WFP's Strategic Objectives, ensuring complete alignment within the Programme. However, at least in the case of the Lao People's Democratic Republic CPE, it was found that this focus on corporate priorities meant less

attention was paid to: i) the country-specific objectives WFP aimed to achieve; ii) government goals that operations were meant to contribute to; or iii) the seeking out of synergies between operations.

⇒ *Making strategic choices*

18. **Analytical underpinnings.** In both countries, WFP had undertaken analytical work to inform its programming choices, and the evaluations reconfirmed WFP's strong capacity in food security analyses, both in emergency situations (Malawi) and in more stable contexts (Lao People's Democratic Republic). Documents were of high quality and provided valuable insights into food security and vulnerability. The country offices made use of existing analytical work and research done by others, which is an efficient way to inform programming. However, the quality of analysis underpinning programming decisions was:
- variable and not always robust;
 - dependent on external expertise;
 - not always adjusted to changing contexts; and
 - not consistent over time.
19. In addition, vulnerability analyses did not automatically result in programming decisions.
20. In particular the evaluation of the Malawi portfolio indicated that the country office could have benefited from stronger analytical capacities especially during the transition period from emergency to recovery.
21. **Perceptions.** In both countries, WFP's image is that of an agency capable of responding rapidly in emergency situations. In Lao People's Democratic Republic, WFP was also appreciated as a partner in more development-oriented programming, whereas in Malawi the country office faced a challenging situation where the Government and international donors raised serious questions about WFP's continued role in the country once the emergency was followed by a recovery phase. Diverse signals from the Government — being on the one hand critical of WFP's food aid role while at the same time asking for WFP's support in developing social protection measures — required WFP to find its new role in recovery and to shift from being a food aid agency to a food assistance agency. WFP found itself in something of a vicious circle of decreasing capacities and increasing donor scepticism about WFP's credibility in recovery and development work. It was not until 2008 that WFP began to articulate a new role for itself in a recovery environment.
22. **Funding model.** The tonnage-based funding model had implications for both country portfolios. On the positive side, the model enabled WFP to rapidly scale up its operations in Malawi when needed. It resulted in very pragmatic *bottom-up* planning of programme activities, based on knowledge of what can be done and funded. However, the model does not provide for resources to do necessary analytical work to underpin well-informed strategic decisions at the country level, at least not in the case of these two countries where WFP has a small or medium portfolio. The funding model provides incentives to look for tonnage-based solutions, because other solutions – even if equally relevant – do not generate the resources necessary to implement them. The model also involves associating all expenditure directly with the operation for which the funds were contributed. This arrangement means that operations take place in isolation from each other. Valuable

opportunities to create synergies between programme activities or learning from one to the other operation are lost.

⇒ *Portfolio performance and results*

23. **Efficiency.** In both countries, the evaluations observed challenges with pipeline breaks and timeliness of delivery. In the case of Malawi, these challenges were met through flexible resource management across the southern African countries affected by the drought and receiving assistance through a regional protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO). In Lao People's Democratic Republic, the timeliness of food deliveries was variable, which affected efficiency and effectiveness. The monitoring system was not designed to track timeliness and alert the country office to problems. The underlying factors for delays included: uneven financial flows and limited access to interim funding mechanisms at the input side, and waiting periods for the removal of unexploded ordinances and the inspection of completed FFW schemes after completion.
24. Another factor that affected the efficiency of programmes in Malawi and Lao People's Democratic Republic was the population density in the target areas and the associated number of beneficiaries. In Malawi, the country office decided (before the arrival of the evaluation team) to refocus its nutrition programme to fewer geographical areas, selected on the basis of need, to ensure greater efficiency. In Lao People's Democratic Republic, the challenge lies in reaching small groups of people in remote areas, which combines low beneficiary numbers with high transport costs – conditions under which efficient delivery is difficult to achieve.
25. **Effectiveness.** Both of the portfolios evaluated achieved important outcomes for targeted population groups, even though it was sometimes difficult to fully evaluate outcomes because of monitoring weaknesses.
 - **General food distribution.** The Malawi CPE concluded that WFP effectively delivered food assistance during the crises of the 2001/02 and 2005/06 droughts, reconfirming WFP's strong comparative advantage in these situations. In Lao People's Democratic Republic, the food-for-relief activities had a mixed record in meeting their objectives, especially when the timeliness of delivery affected the extent to which short-term requirements could be met.
 - **Food for education (FFE).** In both countries, the evaluations observed positive trends in education performance indicators (enrolment, attendance and drop-out rates). In Malawi they were more clearly attributable to school feeding, where schools without school feeding performed less well. In Lao People's Democratic Republic, school feeding had taken place in parallel with other assistance to the education sector (infrastructure, teacher training, materials and the essential package). The composite of this assistance explained increased enrolment rates. Another factor also played a significant role: the teachers' ability to speak the local language and integrate into the community made a significant difference to educational performance and ownership of the school feeding programme in Lao People's Democratic Republic.
 - **Nutrition programmes.** In Malawi, the evaluation found that WFP made a significant contribution to the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition and by implication, contributed to the prevention of severe acute malnutrition and excess mortality in targeted areas. This success was attributed, in part, to the full integration of WFP emergency assistance into government priorities and programmes. In Lao People's Democratic Republic, the portfolio included only smaller nutrition interventions at the time of evaluation, for which it was too early to assess outcomes.

- **Food for assets.** The CPEs found that this programme activity had created valuable assets in both countries, although effectiveness was dependent on the extent to which these programmes were designed by the communities themselves and then implemented in full ownership. Outcomes were also better when programmes were implemented with partners that provided technical supervision and non-food inputs. Similar to the strategic evaluation on livelihood recovery, the Malawi CPE found this programme activity to be underfunded, whereas in the case of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, it depended on the programme category: the PRRO was well funded, whereas the development project (DEV) gradually reduced its activities.

Evaluations of Operations

26. This section of the AER looks at the evaluations' findings in terms of programme design, implementation and results. A significant number of evaluation reports pointed out that it was difficult for evaluation teams to assess programme outcomes and results because of weaknesses in logical frameworks and programme monitoring. These issues are dealt with in more detail in paragraphs 33 and 40 below.

⇒ *Overview*

27. This AER reports on 14 evaluations of operations, which represents a substantial increase over the 4 reports covered in the 2008 AER. In addition, the 2009 group includes 4 decentralized evaluations,³ along with 10 commissioned by OE. WFP's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) was used by all the evaluation teams for the reports under consideration – leading, it appears, to a more systematic coverage of programme issues within the overall framework of the evaluation criteria.
28. The evaluations were not representative of the entirety of WFP's ongoing operations. The number of evaluations is too small to provide a statistically representative sample;⁴ 6.5 percent of ongoing operations were evaluated. In addition, Table 3 shows that PRROs are considerably over-represented and EMOPs under-represented, which is owing to the short-term nature of emergency operations, which makes it difficult to programme and undertake standard evaluations. There are also no special operations included in the 2010 group of evaluations.

³ Decentralized evaluations are commissioned by country offices or regional bureaux using the EQAS templates and technical notes and guidance, with oversight and support from OE as appropriate.

⁴ A minimum of 30 evaluations of operations is required to have a statistically valid sample from which lessons can be drawn for the portfolio as a whole.

	Active operations in 2008		Evaluations of operations		
	Number	Distribution across categories (percent)	Number	Distribution across categories (percent)	Percent of operations evaluated (percent)
CP	31	15	3	22	10
DEV	22	10	1	7	5
EMOP	48	22	1	7	2
PRRO	69	32	9	64	13
SO	44	21	-	-	-
Total	214	100	14	100	7

Source: WFP 2009 Annual Report

29. Almost all operations included FFE and nutrition components. FFW was included in 10 of the 14 operations, while general food distribution (GFD) was part of seven of the evaluated operations. Table 3 below provides an overview of the components by operation, including the country and the programme category. More details on each of the operations are provided in Annex III.

Country	Category	Main programme activities			
		FFE	FFW/FFA	GFD*	Nutrition
OE evaluations					
Afghanistan	PRRO	x	x	x	x
Bangladesh	CP	x	x	x	x
Burkina Faso	PRRO				x
Côte d'Ivoire	PRRO	x	x	x	x
Democratic Rep. of the Congo	PRRO	x	x	x	x
Ethiopia	CP	x	x		
Guatemala	PRRO				x
Liberia	PRRO	x	x	x	x
Mozambique	CP	x			
Rep. of Congo	PRRO	x	x		x
Decentralized evaluations					
Guinea	PRRO	x	x		x
Lesotho	DEV	x			
Philippines	EMOP	x	x	x	x
Sierra Leone	PRRO	x	x		x

* Includes vulnerable group distribution

FFA = food for assets, FFE = food for education, FFW = food for work, GFD = general food distribution

⇒ *Operation design*

30. **Relevance and targeting.** Generally WFP programmes were relevant to the needs of the populations and correctly targeted, when based on up-to-date needs assessments and adequate programming analysis in changing contexts.
- In Burkina Faso WFP collaboratively developed the PRRO objectives with inputs from government ministries, UNCT partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) — building directly on the findings of a multi-agency assessment mission in 2006 that looked at rising undernutrition and rural food insecurity.
 - In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Liberia PRROs, the evaluations found that programme activities needed to be adjusted to take into account recent needs assessments. Both the Liberia and Sierra Leone PRROs needed to be more responsive to transitional contexts, with shifts away from relief to recovery and development. In the Sierra Leone (decentralized) evaluation, the shift from a relief to a recovery mode involved looking at linking FFW activities to ongoing agricultural development initiatives.
 - The Sierra Leone and DRC evaluations found the need to improve WFP’s analysis of the cultural and socio-economic realities of the targeted populations. In Sierra Leone this related to issues such as dietary habits, traditional safety nets and the importance of supporting asset rehabilitation. In DRC the PRRO had not properly analysed the phenomenon of “commuter” populations and this had led to some confusion about double beneficiaries.⁵
31. **Relevance of food for education.** FFE activities were often assessed as relevant responses to country circumstances. Nonetheless, it is important to note that in three evaluations the relevance of FFE was questioned in specific contexts. In Mozambique, for example, there was seen to be a lack of clarity between the educational and food insecurity/undernutrition objectives of FFE and this led to country-wide activities that compromised efficiency and effectiveness. In Liberia school feeding was questioned because it did not address the serious nutrition needs of the under-5 population and schools were closed during the height of the hungry season from July to September. The piloting of a wet school feeding component in Afghanistan was questioned by the evaluators because of the lack of adequate consultation or justification.
32. **Gender.** There is evidence from the operational evaluations that WFP is incorporating gender analysis in its responses. In Bangladesh particular attention has been paid to putting WFP’s Enhanced Commitments to Women into practice. In Ethiopia the CP was found to have a major focus on increasing the participation of women at all levels – as beneficiaries and as participants in development planning, implementing and managing. In Afghanistan a commitment to gender equality was directly reflected in the design of many of the project activities implemented under the programme, including the obligation of cooperating partners to ensure women’s participation at decision-making levels, increase women’s control over food and collect and analyze sex-disaggregated data. In the Liberia PRRO the evaluation team found that strenuous efforts had been made to address gender issues as part of the design and implementation of the activities, and also through the way that WFP conducted its business, strongly supporting initiatives to tackle issues of sexual exploitation and abuse. This positive picture must be offset to some extent: some

⁵ “Commuters” live in camps for security reasons but return home as soon as they can to tend their land so that they maintain their sharecropping rights, fearing the loss of their fields.

evaluations found weakness in this area and in some programmes “gender” was simply equated with women’s activities.

33. **Alignment with policies and strategies.** Across the board, evaluations found WFP’s operations to be well aligned to government policies and strategies and to fit well into development assistance frameworks in the country and sometimes in the region. Similarly, all operations were found to be well aligned with both the new and previous WFP Strategic Plan, as all operation designs were adjusted to incorporate the new results framework. This general alignment with internal and external policies and strategies was necessary for good programming, but did not automatically lead to high-quality programming. As found with the CPEs, it is relatively easy to align with internal and external frameworks but more difficult to make choices that result in the most effective and efficient programmes.
34. **Programme design and synergies.** Evaluations⁶ found considerable room for improvement in programme design: operations contained a large number of programme activities, which were often insufficiently linked, too fragmented and dispersed, and over-ambitious. Objectives were poorly articulated and the rationale for programme activities was often not explained in design documents. These issues are closely linked to difficulties with logical frameworks that include inconsistencies between outputs, outcomes and goals; the inappropriateness of indicators; and the lack of targets. These weaknesses affect the quality of monitoring systems, which have been consistently weak (see also paragraph 40).
35. **Learning from earlier programmes.** The extent to which learning from earlier programmes has been incorporated into current activities varies considerably. In Afghanistan the evaluation noted that the findings of previous evaluations had been considered in the programme design of the PRRO and some projects such as the bakery activity were discontinued as a result, while emphasis was put on the need to improve the linkage between assessment, programming and monitoring, particularly for outcome monitoring. However in Mozambique recommendations from earlier evaluations and other relevant studies had not been sufficiently incorporated as a means to improve the school feeding programme, resulting in the continuation of a scattered, expensive and non-sustainable approach. A number of programmes showed examples of innovative programme design.

⇒ *Operational implementation*

36. **Targeting.** In general, programmes appear to have been targeted according to systematic surveys or assessment missions, although as mentioned in paragraph 29, some programmes were slow to update their assessments to take account of changing contexts. Satisfactory targeting was noted in particular in the Afghanistan PRRO, the Bangladesh CP and the Burkina Faso PRRO. In each case, precise criteria were used for selecting geographical areas for implementing programme activities and for identifying specific target groups. In less successful examples, observed in two evaluations, targeting criteria were unclear or did not respond to vulnerability indicators.

⁶ Evaluations of operations focus on one operation at a time, which has resulted in missing out on understanding the synergies between operations and placing the operation into a larger context. OE is addressing this problem by placing greater emphasis on CPEs, which by definition aim to understand the synergies between programme activities and between operations.

37. **Beneficiary counting.** A number of evaluations (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Liberia and Sierra Leone) questioned the accuracy of beneficiary numbers and the ways in which they were calculated. In particular, the evaluations found it important to reconcile the fact that reported beneficiary numbers might be in line with expected targets, but were often being served with as little as 50 percent of the originally foreseen tonnage of food. This situation meant that beneficiaries received smaller rations (per distribution or aggregate over the year) than originally planned and often over shorter periods than originally foreseen. A beneficiary receiving one ration once in a year was counted equally to one who received daily rations for the entire year. Achievements are difficult to establish on this basis.
38. **Partnerships.** The evaluation reports paint a generally positive picture of WFP's partnerships with governments, NGOs and other stakeholders. These partnerships are often long-standing relationships of trust that positively affected WFP performance. A number of evaluations stressed that WFP's ability to deliver programmes was closely tied to the availability and capacity of its partners. The quality of partnerships influences the effectiveness and efficiency of WFP programme delivery. When working well, the comparative advantages of partners' organizational cultures could be used effectively to promote local ownership of interventions. However, partnerships were also weakened by other agencies' inability to attract sufficient funding to fulfil their intended roles and obligations. In some cases, collaboration among United Nations agencies was weak. Some partner agencies, particularly NGOs, complained about arduous and lengthy procedures for agreeing programme cooperation, in particular in the area of FFW for rural development.
39. **Resource levels.** Most evaluations noted substantial shortfalls in funding during at least part of the operation implementation period. Exceptions were programmes such as Lesotho school feeding and the Mozambique CP, whereas the Afghanistan PRRO went from a phase of being severely underfunded to being 82 percent funded. Country offices used various approaches to manage these shortfalls including using the Immediate Response Account, sharing logistics with other WFP programmes, increasing local purchases and switching from international staff to United Nations volunteers. The effects of resource shortfalls are pipeline breaks, adjustments in rations, reduction in programme activities and reduction in staff.
40. **Logistics.** The 2009 evaluations generally reconfirm WFP's reputation for logistics expertise and achievements, often deployed in demanding circumstances. Not surprisingly a number of programmes faced formidable logistics challenges. In some countries, longstanding difficulties remained unresolved. The evaluation of the PRRO in the Republic of the Congo found recurrent problems of transport difficulties and pipeline breaks that required WFP to give special attention to the logistics problems that have existed since it resumed its operations. In Ethiopia difficulties in delivering food from regional WFP depots to school sites by government-contracted local transporters had persisted for a long time and required the final resolution. In Mozambique the logistics arrangements of the CP were complex, labour-intensive and expensive: countrywide targeting of beneficiary schools created serious logistics challenges, with delivery points scattered over long distances for small quantities of food. This had negative effects on the operation's efficiency.
41. **Monitoring.** Just as in previous AERs, there continue to be problems with monitoring. Evaluators found that outputs were monitored but outcomes were seldom reported on. Monitoring information generally does not feed into decision-making or provide the basis

for actively managing and correcting problems as they arise. Systems are not designed to meet specific information needs, which is also reflected in part in poor programme design (see paragraph 33). Baseline information is often not collected, or if it is, it is not stored in ways that allow for meaningful follow-up surveys. In some cases, the many diverse monitoring systems generate a lot of data that is then hard to reconcile and that show inconsistencies, apart from being costly to WFP. In contrast, most monitoring systems are weak because of a lack of resources allocated for monitoring. The difficult terrain in which WFP operates poses additional challenges, with high dependence on partners to collect and report monitoring data.

42. **Learning during implementation.** Evaluators highlighted some situations where WFP programmes had suffered from recurring difficulties over a long period of time. It seemed that information from earlier monitoring, review and evaluation had not led to effective steps to resolve these problems. For instance, in the Ethiopia CP the longstanding Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions to More Sustainable Livelihoods (MERET) programme suffered from unresolved problems with food deliveries, procurement and the processing of payments to WFP partners. This was thought to be the consequence of WFP managers having been so absorbed managing other elements of the WFP programme in the country. In other cases, such as Liberia, the evaluation found the country office demonstrated a strong ability to adjust to changing circumstances and learn from experience.

⇒ *Operational results*

43. **Effectiveness.** In spite of the difficulties that evaluation teams found in assessing outcomes and the many challenges that the various programmes experienced, the evaluations found positive outcomes in many instances.
- **General food distribution.** Outcomes expected from this programme activity included helping affected people and households during times of shock to address their immediate food shortages. The programmes aimed to reduce the risk of hunger and undernutrition, and of negative coping strategies. Some operations aimed to address improved food consumption including dietary diversity, or in emergency contexts to stabilize nutrition indicators, as in the case of DRC. The evaluations observed that the programmes generally had positive outcomes and in some cases positive temporary safety nets were provided to meet the needs of vulnerable populations.
 - **Food for education.** School feeding programmes generally performed well in improving enrolment rates, increasing attendance and closing the gender gap, but evaluations observed that education performance data was subject to many factors beyond school feeding. The effectiveness of school feeding was influenced by external factors; for example, in an environment of high insecurity and instability like DRC, enrolment rates were not significantly increased, but attendance rates were high and gender parity good. The evaluation in Mozambique observed that school meals worked best in contexts where enrolment rates were low, as it provided a much stronger incentive in these circumstances. The “magnet effect” of school feeding – attracting children to schools – in a number of cases created pressure on the education system.
 - **Nutrition programmes.** The operations aimed to attain a number of nutrition outcomes, including reducing levels in stunting and wasting, improving recovery rates and birthweight, and ensuring adherence to treatments for tuberculosis and/or HIV. A

large number of evaluations indicated that these programmes had been effective in meeting their objectives and that positive trends against performance indicators had been observed. But in many cases the evaluations also emphasized the absence of relevant data and the manifold factors that affect outcomes. External factors that affect outcomes included livelihood systems and the economy, which determined whether and how well people could feed themselves; social factors and traditions that determined whether improved nutrition practices (feeding, cooking, nutrition knowledge) were accepted and internalized; and living conditions (including availability of potable water). Within the programmes purview, factors that played a role included the ration size – which as indicated above was not always as large as originally foreseen – and ration sharing, both of which affected the actual intake and thus nutritional value that each beneficiary received.

- **Food for assets.** The outcomes of these components were measured against two criteria: i) the provision of food in times of need; and ii) the assets created. Four evaluations (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia) reported positive results on both accounts, although in some of these and other evaluations the scaling back of this component and the lack of resources were noted as major factors that curtailed achieving stated objectives.
44. **Impact.** Evaluations of operations do not have the time and resources to undertake in-depth data collection to demonstrate impact. Nonetheless, the evaluations captured a number of impacts that stakeholders had observed. Many of these had to do with changing perceptions and facilitating processes beyond the immediate operation or programme activity. For instance, WFP played a role in:
- revitalizing the education system in rural areas in Liberia and encouraging the return and resettlement of displaced populations;
 - creating a better understanding in Ethiopia of the connection between hunger and children’s ability to learn;
 - generating social returns in Bangladesh, where women enhanced skills, knowledge, mobility and greater social capital through group support and increased confidence;
 - Sierra Leone, helping the “lost generation” regain social and economic “worth” to the local community;
 - the Philippines, where the EMOP and WFP’s forming part of the international presence was seen to have also indirectly supported the peace process, according to beneficiaries interviewed; and
 - Burkina Faso, where the operation had contributed to fostering an exchange of ideas and experiences that was appreciated by local stakeholders.
45. **Sustainability.** The evaluation reports found mixed results in terms of the prospects for programme sustainability. A number of positive assessments were made where WFP programmes were integrated into government programmes and at community level where local ownership was likely to protect and maintain assets. This ownership could be manifest at national level, for instance in Côte d’Ivoire or Liberia, where school feeding was integrated into the national education system, or at local levels such as in Ethiopia, where the evaluation stressed the importance of strengthening the capability of local groups to be able to continue to manage core processes after WFP support ends. Sustainability and hand-over were less likely in those cases where capacity development efforts had not taken place or had not been successful. The lack of success was attributed

to the absences of clear capacity development strategies, lack of appropriate resources for capacity development, and insufficient capacity in country offices. In addition, the sustainability of school feeding in Mozambique was affected by the costliness of the current model, which makes it difficult to integrate into the national education system, or to replicate on a large scale. The sustainability of assets created through FFW depended highly on local ownership.

Conclusions and Recommendations

⇒ *Common findings*

46. The evaluations found WFP's work to be well aligned with government policies, WFP strategies and people's needs. Targeting was reasonably good, especially when it was based on updated needs assessments and programme analyses. The evaluations found it was relatively easy for programmes to be aligned to broad WFP and external strategies and priorities. However, it was more difficult for WFP to be strategically placed to ensure highest effectiveness and efficiency of its assistance. The absence of country strategies, complex programme design with too many diverse activities, and a lack of integration of activities within operations, at country level and of corporate initiatives combined made it more difficult to exercise strategic choices. In addition, analytical capacity, which is required to inform decision-making and actions, is afforded insufficient resources.
47. The evaluations demonstrated WFP's strong capacity to scale up and respond rapidly to changing demands in case of emergencies. However, they also illustrated challenges when the changing context required scaling down, a shift in WFP's role and different response strategies as people, communities and countries made transitions from emergency situations toward recovery.
48. The evaluations found WFP performed well in general food distribution – to meet the needs of people in times of crises – and in the education sector, where school feeding had often provided an additional incentive to improve education outcomes (increased enrolment and attendance and lower drop-out rates). Nutrition programmes demonstrated positive results, but evaluations also observed that indicators were affected by many more factors than WFP food distributions, which makes it more difficult to attain or sustain outcomes. FFW programmes, while showing some positive outcomes, were the weakest.
49. Two challenges, however, affected the reporting on outcomes: i) the current method of beneficiary counting does not reflect the amount or frequency of rations a beneficiary receives and therefore can be misleading; and ii) monitoring systems continue to be extremely weak and do not generate outcome data in a systematic way. The Programme therefore misses opportunities to learn from the performance of its operations and make necessary adjustments to increase effectiveness when possible.
50. Evaluations often found that shortcomings in programme implementation and results could very often be traced to resource issues and the funding model. At Headquarters, achievements were made thanks to extra-budgetary contributions to improve contingency planning or needs assessments, but resources were not always available to carry through necessary activities. At country level, a tonnage-based funding model does not provide resources to underpin country strategies or programme design with the necessary analytical work, creates incentives to develop high-tonnage responses, and has rendered programme designs overly optimistic when funding levels could not be achieved. Efficiency and learning across operations was not always guaranteed, as people were hired and worked on specific operations.

51. WFP's partnerships were generally found to be strong. The evaluations highlighted the importance of working in partnership, which with the United Nations agencies was easier at the national level, and with government and NGO partners was stronger in the delivery of assistance. The capacity of partners was not always strong – a function of the difficult terrain in which WFP operates – and this affected programme delivery and monitoring.

⇒ *Recommendations*

52. **Recommendation 1:** WFP senior management and the Board should consider the implications of the current funding model illustrated in this report when discussing a new model, which will have consequences for the ways WFP can contribute strategically, effectively and efficiently to its partner countries and monitor its results.
53. **Recommendation 2:** WFP should seek to ensure its operations are less complex (with fewer programme activities) and that stronger synergies are built between programme activities within an operation and across operations at the country level.
54. **Recommendation 3:** WFP should seek to transfer its strong ability to adapt to changing contexts in case of emergencies to situations of transition to recovery or development. Such capacity requires more than scaling back in the sense of shrinking the programmes: it requires rethinking their objectives and their delivery mode.
55. **Recommendation 4:** WFP should invest in improving its monitoring systems. These systems should be designed on the basis of the information needs of decision-makers at different levels and be clearly linked to decision-making and follow-up actions.

EVALUATION AT WFP

56. This section of the Annual Evaluation Report provides an overview of the evaluation work done as compared to original plans including human and financial resources available; OE's work to strengthen evaluation capacities at WFP; collaboration with evaluation networks; and OE's outlook for 2010–2011.

Evaluation Activities in 2009

57. **Work plan accomplishments.** Over the biennium, the evaluation work programme underwent a significant shift by introducing country portfolio and impact evaluations that had not been done in WFP before. These evaluations fill important information gaps in understanding WFP's role and contributions in a country on the one hand, and the impact of WFP's assistance on the other.
58. The evaluation work plan for 2008–2009⁷ suffered shortfalls largely in the timeliness of completing evaluations. The performance improved between 2008, when only two evaluations of operations were completed,⁸ and 2009, when ten such evaluations were completed. Overall, between 75 and 100 percent of OE's work plan was accomplished. The largest shortfall was observed in the area of decentralized evaluations, for which there are no dedicated human or financial resources: evaluations compete with other requirements and priorities of the country offices. A total of 14 decentralized evaluations were foreseen for the biennium, of which 5 were completed and 8 were still ongoing by the end of 2009. Annex IV provides a summary of the implementation of the work plan.


⁷ WFP Management Plan 2008–2009, WFP/EB.2/2007/5-A/1.

⁸ WFP Annual Evaluation Report 2008, WFP/EB.A/2009/7-A.

59. **Human resources.** In 2009, OE recruited one external evaluation expert, who joined the team in April 2009. This recruitment improved the ratio of externally recruited evaluation professionals to WFP staff on rotation from 2:6 to 3:5. Another evaluation expert was recruited in December 2009. With her arrival in March 2010, for the first time OE will achieve a balance between WFP staff on rotation and externally recruited evaluation experts (4:4), as foreseen in the Evaluation Policy. During the year, OE experienced a shift in the gender ratio with the reassignment of two men who were replaced by women. By the end of 2009, OE was staffed predominantly by women in both professional and support staff categories. In 2009 the ratio of OE staff to overall WFP staff remained the same as in 2008, 0.08 percent. Total staffing numbers are provided in Table 4 below.

	WFP staff on rotation	Externally recruited evaluation experts	Total
Director (D2)		1	1
Senior Evaluation Officers (P5)	2	1	3
Evaluation Officers (P4)	3	1	4
General Service Staff (G6 and G3)	3		3
Total	8	3	11

60. In 2009, OE employed 58 consultants for 15 evaluations and the Annual Evaluation Report, with an average of 4 consultants per evaluation. 28 percent of the consultants were from developing countries and 72 percent from developed countries. The gender distribution among the consultants was 69 percent men and 31 percent women.



61. **Financial resources.** As indicated above, evaluations are carried out predominantly by externally recruited consultants; therefore they require considerable non-staff budget allocations. The Management Plan allocated US\$1.4 million from the Programme Support and Administrative (PSA) budget for all non-staff costs, including office administration and others. For 2009, OE received an additional US\$380,450. The non-staff budget finances the conduct of strategic, country portfolio, impact and operations evaluations managed by OE, and office costs. The financial ratio of evaluation expenditure (OE only) to total WFP budget was 0.06 percent. No separate budget provisions were made for decentralized evaluations. In addition, OE received contributions from the governments of Germany and Sweden for its training programme for decentralized evaluations.

⇒ *Activities to strengthen evaluation capacities*

62. **Annual Consultation on Evaluation.** In 2009, the Board consultation on evaluation was, for the first time, chaired by the Board President. The consultation gives WFP's membership an opportunity to provide guidance on priorities for evaluation and to discuss the findings of the AER.
63. **Evaluation Quality Assurance System.** The draft EQAS materials for country portfolio evaluations were developed in 2009 based on the experience with the first two CPEs started in 2008. The materials provide complete guidance on the evaluation process and various outputs expected during the year as well as associated quality standards. Work was also done to develop the same set of documents for impact evaluations, which were finalized in early 2010. In addition, after using EQAS for evaluations of operations, the experience was reviewed and necessary revisions made to the report template. These changes were tested in an evaluation started in late 2009 and will apply to all evaluations of operations conducted from 2010 onwards. Two areas that require further attention, based on the analysis for this AER, are: i) beneficiary accountability, which has been receiving a great deal of attention in the wider humanitarian world in recent years and is the focus of work by initiatives such as the Humanitarian Accountability Project; and ii) the need for more systematic use of programme standards, be they internal or external – such as the Sphere Minimum Standards in Disaster Response.
64. **OE support to decentralized evaluations.** With the help of grants provided by the governments of Germany and of Sweden, OE provided 20 WFP staff members with training in basic evaluation skills using EQAS standards. The course took place in two stages, which was a useful way to refresh participants' familiarity acquired during the first training and to deepen knowledge and understanding. This training was provided only to staff who would be managing decentralized evaluations, which, because of the lack of funding for this type of evaluation (see paragraph 60), limited the actual participation rate. Demand for general evaluation training is high, but is unlikely to be effective unless associated with actual practice in managing an evaluation.
65. **OE staff skills and knowledge development.** During 2009, OE organized an evaluation course on impact evaluation for all professional staff in the office. The course was organized to sharpen skills in preparation for the increased number of impact evaluations OE will undertake in 2010–2011.
66. **Closing the learning loop.** OE began work on an initiative to develop tailored learning materials that will make lessons from evaluations more accessible to stakeholders within and outside WFP. Potential prototypes were identified based on the information needs of target audiences. The first prototype – Top 10 Lessons – was developed on two subjects (targeting, and cash and vouchers) and will be tested in early 2010, before the series will be expanded to other subjects. Other prototypes, such as country-specific briefs, will be developed and tested in 2010.
67. **Web-based solutions.** OE commissioned a web professional to analyze its website on wfp.org and suggest improvements to its content and structure in order to make evaluation information more accessible to audiences within and outside WFP. The analysis of the current website and recommendations were completed at the end of 2009 and will be considered for implementation in 2010.

Cooperation with Evaluation Networks

68. OE continued to be active in the United Nations Evaluation Group through active participation in task forces on impact evaluation, evaluation capacity development and quality standards for evaluation. It is also part of inter-agency working groups on joint humanitarian impact evaluations and inter-agency real time evaluations, discussed in the realm of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance. OE has also been on the management groups for the Cluster Evaluation Phase II, the impact evaluation of the common humanitarian fund, and of the multi-donor evaluation in Southern Sudan.

Outlook for 2010–2011

69. OE will not undertake new operations evaluations in the 2010–2011 biennium, except for two evaluations that were carried over from the 2009 work plan. The reasons for this change are numerous: WFP's operations are flexible (frequent revisions during implementation) and have short time horizons. Therefore, CPEs are better placed to capture the adaptation of operations (when components are shifted from one to another) and the continuity of programme activities that may be implemented over long periods, even if each operation has a shorter time-span. In addition, the relative cost of one operation evaluation compares unfavourably to that of CPEs. Finally, the resources available were insufficient to conduct the number of operations evaluations necessary to exercise accountability for operations as a whole or to extract transferable lessons.

70. Instead, OE will focus on more complex evaluations. This approach promises to generate more meaningful and useful information for all stakeholders concerned. In the 2010–2011 biennium OE will continue with its approach to strategic evaluations, aiming to implement four during the biennium. The number of CPEs and impact evaluations will be expanded based on the experience gained in 2008–2009. In addition, OE has been asked to evaluate the “Purchase for Progress” programme (requested by the responsible unit), WFP's school feeding policy (requested by the Board) and, jointly with FAO, the agriculture and market support provided by FAO and WFP to partners in Uganda (a joint evaluation proposed by the country offices).

71. To support the shift towards these more complex evaluations, OE is undertaking measures to increase staff capacity through internal focus groups that foster the exchange of knowledge and skills among OE staff, and also involve discussions with technical divisions in WFP. Through this process, standardized reporting requirements are being developed, including indicators and standards (such as the Sphere project) for comparison in response to the weakness indicated in paragraph 62. In addition, these groups will identify training needs that will be met by organizing training for all evaluation officers to ensure common understanding and approaches. OE will also continue with initiatives such as Closing the Learning Loop and improving its internal and external website to make lessons from evaluations more accessible.

ANNEX I

Evaluations Completed in 2009

⇒ *Strategic Evaluations*

Strategic Evaluation of WFP's Contingency Planning (2002–2008)

Joint Thematic Evaluation of FAO and WFP Support to Information Systems for Food Security

Strategic Evaluation of the Effectiveness of WFP Livelihood Recovery Interventions

⇒ *Country Portfolio Evaluations*

Lao People's Democratic Republic Country Portfolio

Malawi Country Portfolio

⇒ *Operations evaluations*

1. Afghanistan PRRO 104270
2. Bangladesh CP 104100 (2007–2010)
3. Burkina Faso PRRO 105410
4. Côte d'Ivoire PRRO 106720
5. Democratic Republic of the Congo PRRO 106080
6. Republic of the Congo PRRO 103121
7. Ethiopia CP 104300 (2007–2011)
8. Guatemala PRRO 104570
9. Liberia PRRO 104540
10. Mozambique CP 104460 (2007–2009)

⇒ *Decentralized evaluations*

11. Guinea PRRO 105530
12. Lesotho Development Project 105820
13. Philippines EMOP 104890
14. Sierra Leone PRRO 105540

ANNEX II

Portfolio Overview

TABLE A.II.1: LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC - TYPES OF ACTIVITIES BY OPERATION, 2000–2008 <i>(mt of food, as per design documents)</i>						
Operation category and number	Approval	Completion	Total	Food for relief	Food for work	School feeding
DEV 587400	2001	2003	6 634		6 634	
EMOP 63110	2000	2003	6 960	6 960		
DEV 100780	2002	2005	6 850			6 850
DEV 103060	2004	2009	11 855		11 855	
PRRO 103190	2004	2007	10 000		10 000	
DEV 100781	2005	2010	26 854			26 854
PRRO 105660	2007	2009	14 441	6 836	7 605	
EMOP 107700	2008	2008	581	581		
Total			84 175	21 011	29 460	33 704

Source: Lao People's Democratic Republic country office and project documentation

TABLE A.II.2: MALAWI - TYPES OF ACTIVITIES BY OPERATION, 2000–2008 <i>(mt of food, as per design documents)</i>							
Operation category and number	Approval	Completion	Total	FFA/FFW	GFD/ Targeted Food Distribution	Nutrition ^(a)	School feeding
CP 100140	1998	2001	51 555	18 406		18 231	14 918
CP 101060	2001	2006	78 000	19 000		34 000	25 000
EMOP 100560	2001	2001	8 822		8 822		
EMOP 101520	2002	2002	1 635		1 635		
EMOP 101530	2002	2002	11 375		11 375		
EMOP 102000	2002	2003	264 501	No breakdown by activity given ^(b)			
EMOP 102010	2002	2002	54 426		52 800	1 626	
EMOP 102900	2002	2002	36 696	13 781		14 064	8 851
PRRO 103090	2004	2005	4 496	550	3 946		
PRRO 103100	2004	2007	161 306	No breakdown by activity given ^(c)			
DEV 103940	2004	2006		Not tonnage-based but capacity development			
DEV 105810	2007	2011	70 104				70 104
PRRO 105860	2007	2010	214 679	No breakdown by activity given ^(d)			
Total			957 595				

Source: WFP project documents

Notes:

^(a) Nutrition programmes include: supplementary and therapeutic feeding, HIV and AIDS activities, and maternal-and-child health and nutrition.

^(b) EMOP 102000 included: general food distribution, nutrition programmes (therapeutic and supplementary feeding) and school feeding.

^(c) EMOP 103100 included: food for work, targeted food distribution and nutrition programmes (mother-and-child nutrition, support to people living with HIV, feeding at early childhood development centres).

^(d) PRRO 105860 included: food for assets, general food distribution, nutrition programmes (therapeutic and supplementary feeding and support to people living with HIV) and school feeding.

ANNEX III

FACT SHEET ON OPERATIONS EVALUATED IN 2009

Country/operation	Start date	End date (planned/ revised)	Main activities	Beneficiaries (planned/at time of evaluation)	Metric tons (planned/at time of evaluation)	US\$ (planned/at time of evaluation)	Other ongoing WFP operations
OE operations evaluations							
Afghanistan PRRO 104270 "Post-Conflict Relief and Rehabilitation"	1 Jan 2006	31 Dec 2008/ 31 Dec 2009	GFD, FFW, FFT*, FFE, nutrition/ health	6 597 000/ 15 163 155	520 180/n.a. 1 010 260	360 208 291/ 847 800 856	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
Bangladesh CP 104100 (2007–2010)	1 Jan 2007	31 Dec 2010	FFE, GFD, FFW, Nutrition/ health	8 910 000/n.a. **	565 081/n.a.	266 866 850/n.a.	EMOP 107150 Food assistance to cyclone-affected populations in Southern Bangladesh PRRO 100453 Assistance to Refugees from Myanmar
Burkina Faso PRRO 105410 "Reversing Growing Undernutrition in Food Insecure Regions"	1 Jan 2007	31 Dec 2008/ 31 Dec 2009	Nutrition/health food security	668 500/ 832 600	24 211/ 30 147	18 337 142/ 28 560 891	CP 2006–2010 EMOP 107730
Republic of the Congo PRRO 103121 "Assistance to Populations Affected by Conflicts and Poverty"	1 Jun 2007	31 May 2009	FFE, FFW, GFD, nutrition	n.a./162 300	n.a.	10 400 000/n.a.	-
Côte d'Ivoire PRRO 106720 "Assistance to Populations Affected by the Côte d'Ivoire Protracted Crisis"	1 Jul 2007	31 Dec 2008/ 31 Aug 2009	GFD, FFE, FFW, FFT*, Nutrition/health	981 000/ 1 302 865	47 256/ 1 302 865	41 239 517/ 79 658 506	SO*** 107200 Repairing rural roads and bridges in Côte d'Ivoire SO 100613 Regional air passenger service

* food for training

** n.a. = not available

*** Special Operation



FACT SHEET ON OPERATIONS EVALUATED IN 2009

Country/operation	Start date	End date (planned/ revised)	Main activities	Beneficiaries (planned/at time of evaluation)	Metric tons (planned/at time of evaluation)	US\$ (planned/at time of evaluation)	Other ongoing WFP operations
DRC PRRO 106080 "Targeted Food Aid for the Victims of Armed Conflict and other Vulnerable Groups"	1 Jul 2007	31 Dec 2009	Nutrition/health, FFE, FFA, GFD	3 400 000/ 6 594 690	210 084/ 376 153	230 874 212/ 499 681 226	SO 105560 "Operation Support to the Inter-Agency Logistics Cluster" SO 107440 "Air Transport Service" SO 107180 "Development of Regional Emergency Telecoms Cluster" EMOP 108240 "Emergency Operation in Upper Uele from April 2009"
Ethiopia CP 104300 (2007–2011)	1 Jan 2007	31 Dec 2011	FFE, FFW	1 048 000/ 1 048 000	230 163/ 230 163	115 755 992/ 166 399 253	PRRO 106650 "Responding to Humanitarian Crisis and Enhancing Resilience to Food Insecurity" PRRO 101273 "Food Assistance to Sudanese, Somali and Eritrean Refugees" PRRO 103620 "Enabling Livelihood Protection and Promotion"
Guatemala PRRO 104570 "Recovery and Prevention of Malnutrition for Vulnerable Groups"	Dec 2005	Nov 2008/ Dec 2009	Nutrition/health	n.a./425 572	28 857/n.a.	27 445 337/ 30 476 376	
Liberia PRRO104540 "Food Assistance for Relief and Recovery in Post-Conflict Liberia"	1 Jul 2007	30 Jun 2009	FFE, Nutrition, FFW, GFD, capacity-building		53 632/n.a.	50 600 000/ 75 400 000	DP 107330 "Support for Education"



FACT SHEET ON OPERATIONS EVALUATED IN 2009

Country/operation	Start date	End date (planned/ revised)	Main activities	Beneficiaries (planned/at time of evaluation)	Metric tons (planned/at time of evaluation)	US\$ (planned/at time of evaluation)	Other ongoing WFP operations
Mozambique CP 104460 (2007–2009)	1 Jan 2007	31 Dec 2009	FFE, nutrition	381 400/316 500	66 684/58 407	41 955 863/ 44 309 737	PRRO 106000 “Food Support for Protection and Promotion of Lives and Livelihoods of the most Vulnerable People” SO 107630 “Common ICT support to ‘Delivering as One’ initiative in Mozambique”
Decentralized operations evaluations							
Guinea PRRO 105530 “Post-conflict Transition in the Forest Guinea Region”	1 Jul 2007	30 Jun 2009/ 31 Dec 2009	FFW, FFE, FFT, nutrition/health	396 400/ 923 198	27 589/47 331	24 446 388/ 50 958 683	CP (2007–2011) SO “Air Passenger Service West Africa” SO “Emergency Telecoms Cluster Roll-Out”
Lesotho DEV 105820 “Support Access to Primary Education”	1 Jan 2008	31 Dec 2010	FFE	80 000/50 000	66 669/66 669	4 674 623/ 5 036 095	PRRO 105990 “Social Protection and Food Assistance for Vulnerable Groups in Lesotho”
Philippines EMOP 104890/1 “Immediate Support to Conflict-Affected Populations in Mindanao, Philippines”	Jun 2006	Dec 2009	GFD, FFE, FFW, FFT, nutrition/health	1 100 000/ 2 890 694	n.a./76 758	n.a./55 465 213	
Sierra Leone PRRO 105540 “Food Assistance to Refugee and Returnee-Affected Areas of Sierra Leone”	1 Jul 2007	30 Jun 2009/ 31 Dec 2009	FFW, FFE, nutrition/health, capacity-building	533 000/667 890	31 906/42 242	12 869 282/ 25 420 905	CP 105840 2008–2010 SO – “Air operations”



ANNEX IV

WORK PLAN IMPLEMENTATION								
Type of evaluation	Foreseen in WFP Biennial Management Plan (2008–2009)	Actually implemented in 2008–2009 (by end December 2009)					Achievement	
		Completed	Ongoing	Postponed to next biennium	Cancelled	Total	% completed over plan	% completed and ongoing over plan
Strategic	4	3			1	4	75	75
Country Portfolio	3	2	1			3	67	100
Impact	0		1			1		
Operations	20	12	6	2		20	60	90
Decentralized	40	5	8	1		14	13	33

ANNEX V**Office of Evaluation Staff (as of 31 December 2009)**

Ms Caroline HEIDER, Director

Ms Sally BURROWS, Senior Evaluation Officer (since April 2009)

Ms Marian READ, Senior Evaluation Officer (since September 2009)

Ms Claire CONAN, Evaluation Officer

Mr Michel DENIS, Evaluation Officer

Ms Maureen FORSYTHE, Evaluation Officer

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ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

AER	Annual Evaluation Report
CP	country programme
CPE	country portfolio evaluation
DEV	Development project
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EMOP	Emergency operation
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFA	food for assets
FFE	food for education
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
GFD	general food distribution
NGO	non-governmental organization
OE	Office of Evaluation
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
PSA	Programme Support and Administrative
SO	Special Operation
UNCT	United Nations country team