



WFP Sudan
SPECIAL OPERATION SO 10845.0

Country:	Sudan
Type of project:	Special Operation
Title:	Operational augmentation for WFP and NGO partners in Darfur in support of EMOP 10760.0
Total cost (US\$):	US\$ 27,322,864
Duration:	18 months (May 2009 - November 2010)

Executive Summary

The expulsion of thirteen international non-governmental organizations from Sudan and the dissolution of three national non-governmental organizations in March 2009 has put at risk the provision of food assistance in Darfur to 1.1 million people, medical care for 1.5 million people and drinking water for over 1 million people. Four out of the thirteen non-governmental organizations were WFP partners covering about 35 percent of the Darfur general food distribution plan under the emergency operation 10760.0.

While WFP is addressing the most urgent needs to guarantee the uninterrupted supply of life saving food distributions, it does not have the capacity to fully compensate for the gaps in monitoring, assessment, analysis, targeting and logistics activities left by the loss of these partners. WFP is therefore no longer in a position to ensure an effective and accountable implementation of programmes under EMOP 10760.0.

This special operation will cater for the equipment, staff, systems and facilities necessary to re-establish a stable, strong and safe field presence in Darfur for WFP and its NGO partners by ensuring the:

- provision of Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) compliant office and accommodation facilities for WFP and NGO partners in remote locations with limited or no humanitarian coverage;
- augmentation of operational capacity and technical expertise of WFP and partner NGOs for monitoring, assessment, analysis, targeting and logistics activities to expand their activities to new areas as well as capacity building;
- operational contingency in the event that some areas are not eventually covered by other NGOs, and/or that more NGOs may suspend their programmes in the future.

The special operation's duration is eighteen months, from May 2009 to November 2010 for a total value of US\$ 27,322,864.

Project Background

1. WFP scaled up its emergency response in Darfur in 2004 to address the needs of vulnerable populations displaced by the conflict. Assistance initially targeted displaced camps and was gradually extended to rural communities whose livelihoods had also been affected by the conflict. In 2009, WFP emergency operation (EMOP) 10760.0 targets 5.9 million people in Sudan, including 4.2 million people in Darfur.
2. Six years into the crisis, conditions are not yet in place for the return of the internally displaced people (IDP) and the re-establishment of sustainable livelihoods. The 2008 Darfur Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (DFSLA) found that during the harvest period, when household food availability is at the annual highest, almost half of the households surveyed (45 percent) still remain food-insecure. The status of the current food security situation is fragile and households have a low purchasing power that limits their ability to cope with any potential livelihood shock¹. Nutrition assessments highlight malnutrition levels beyond the emergency threshold and inter-agency assessments show a situation where large-scale humanitarian assistance is still required. WFP already anticipates that food assistance will be required in Darfur in 2010, beyond the current EMOP end date.
3. In March 2009, thirteen NGOs were expelled from the country, putting at risk the provision of humanitarian assistance in Darfur to over 1.5 million people. Four of the thirteen NGOs were WFP partners assisting, through general food distributions (GFD), approximately 1.1 million people from January to June 2009 (corresponding to 35 percent of the planning GFD figures up to June). These numbers are expected to grow further during the lean and rainy season through September, when food insecurity is historically higher.

Project Justification

4. The gap left by the departing NGOs includes the lack of adequate and safe physical facilities in rural areas as well as the availability of operational capacity and technical expertise. The departing NGOs had significant programme management and multi-sector experience, relevant to the local context, which with their departure is no longer available to WFP. Short-term operational solutions based on working with local food distribution committees cannot cover for these essential components of humanitarian programmes, nor provide independent monitoring and accountability.
5. Prior to the current crisis, WFP's Darfur strategy for 2009 aimed at developing a stronger understanding of food security dynamics and a more articulated targeting strategy. The DFSLA outlined an increasingly nuanced food security situation and recommended the establishment of a Food Security Monitoring System to monitor seasonal change and to develop context-specific

¹ Presentation of the 2008 Darfur Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (DFSLA) preliminary findings and key recommendations; Khartoum 23rd February 2009.

interventions. It also recommended the expansion of blanket supplementary feeding, the establishment of safety net programmes and the expanded use of milling vouchers in IDP camps. These strategies require a strong presence of field staff with adequate expertise. It is highly unlikely that remaining partners will be able to rapidly replace the lost programmatic and analytical capacity.

6. Some of the expelled NGOs also had a significant direct role in the management of warehouses, which may not be provided by other NGOs.
7. While WFP is addressing the most urgent needs to guarantee the uninterrupted supply of life saving food distributions, it does not have the capacity to fully compensate for the gaps in monitoring, assessment, analysis and targeting activities.
8. In some areas of Darfur, national and international non-governmental organizations are expected to gradually scale up their operations and take over the management of food distributions but will require WFP logistical and operational support. In other areas, where the expelled non-governmental organizations may not be replaced, WFP will strengthen its presence to directly implement food distributions and monitoring.
9. Quality of operations, monitoring and programme analysis and design, relevant to the local context, cannot however be assumed by new partners in the initial expansion phase. WFP is therefore no longer in a position to ensure effective and accountable implementation of programmes under EMOP 10760.0.
10. To effectively support the EMOP implementation, WFP needs to urgently support the expansion of remaining NGOs and to further develop its ability to work in remote locations.
11. The prevailing insecurity and recent emergence of direct targeting of United Nations and NGO workers in Darfur has increased the need for safe and secure facilities to ensure sustained access to rural areas. A strengthened WFP presence, including the establishment of new and safe office and accommodation facilities in these areas and the deployment of experienced staff, is required to provide additional operational and programme support to NGOs in assessment, analysis, monitoring and targeting.
12. In the short to medium term, the urgency is compounded by the approaching lean and rainy season. Insufficient assistance in the next months could result in increase of malnutrition and large migration to camps with already overstretched infrastructures. A strengthened field presence for WFP and partners would address the present situation and strengthen the capacity to maintain programmes in the event that additional NGOs suspend their activities. It should also lay the foundation for early recovery activities in rural areas, when and where circumstances permit and NGOs are able to successfully re-establish a sustained field presence.

Project Objective(s)

13. The aim of this special operation is to facilitate the uninterrupted supply of food aid to the most affected population and reinstate quality food assistance programmes in Darfur through the re-establishment of a stable, strong and safe field presence in Darfur for WFP and its NGO partners.
14. The outcomes include the:
 - provision of Minimum Operating Security Standard (MOSS) compliant office and accommodation facilities for WFP and NGO partners in remote locations which currently have limited or no humanitarian coverage;
 - operational support and technical expertise augmentation of WFP and partner NGOs for monitoring, assessment, analysis, targeting and logistics to expand their activities to new areas as well as build local capacity;
 - operational contingency in the event that some areas cannot be covered by other NGOs, and/or that additional NGOs may suspend their programmes in the future.

Project Implementation

15. The activities to be undertaken are as follows:

Provision of MOSS compliant office and accommodation facilities:

16. The special operation makes provision for six new WFP satellite offices in remote rural areas, six NGOs offices in urban areas, and for the upgrade of the previous CARE office in Gereida.
17. Six WFP satellite office and accommodation facilities will be established in Darfur, each with the capacity to contain ten people. Each site will be equipped with prefabricated office and accommodation units.
18. These offices will be located in remote areas where there is a strategic need for a direct WFP presence, in support to cooperating partners' operations. They will directly serve WFP and partners but would also facilitate the remote field presence of other United Nations agencies and NGOs in underserved areas with a large population base and known needs. Other organizations could indeed, upon request, stay at the WFP guesthouses and use the WFP office facilities. Potential locations for new offices include Muhajeria and Kass rural in South Darfur, Um Dukhum in West Darfur and Shangil Tobay, Um Baru and Malha in North Darfur.
19. The special operation budget covers the procurement, transport and set up of prefabricated units from the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot into Sudan. Further analysis will also be undertaken to identify different construction methods. The Darfur conflict has led to a distorted process of

urbanization and a construction boom, fuelled in large part by the large and unprecedented presence of the international community, which carries a significant environmental impact. Alternative construction and energy technologies will be studied in order to employ more environmentally sustainable solutions for the new facilities when and where possible.

20. In addition to the new sites, the special operation will cover the extra investments required for expanding NGOs in the start-up phase, which have not been budgeted for under the current EMOP. It is expected that expanding NGOs will require six additional offices in the town of Mornie, Zalingei, Mukjar, Habila and in two additional locations in Darfur. These locations correspond to administrative urban areas where previous NGOs had a presence and where the potential new partners will require an office for management purposes. The final identification of locations for new WFP and NGOs offices will be based on the evolving environment.
21. Under this special operation, WFP will also upgrade the previous CARE office in Gereida, where WFP will directly manage food distributions in the immediate future.
22. A project manager, a full-time engineer and a part-time consultant will be hired to oversee the construction of the new sites. Three additional staff with a dedicated support function (administration and procurement) to the special operation will be based in Khartoum.
23. Two field security officers will be recruited for the duration of the project and to support the construction and establishment phase of the new offices in rural, remote areas.
24. Each site will receive full MOSS compliant equipment and set ups to ensure that appropriate communication systems are available (information and communications equipment, very small aperture terminal, Radio Room) and that security is enhanced for WFP and NGO partners personnel.
25. Light vehicles will also be mobilized to ensure adequate movement of staff and to facilitate assessment and monitoring missions to the most remote areas as well as food distributions. Although carjacking continues to be a high risk in Darfur, and one of the factors limiting humanitarian presence, the establishment of offices in rural areas will help reducing the distance covered through road movement and establish stable and stronger relationships with local communities and leaders, which will facilitate security assessments for road missions. The presence of African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) escorts may also facilitate the use of road missions.

Operational support and technical expertise augmentation of WFP and partner NGOs

26. Specialized and experienced staff will be deployed to work in close coordination with NGOs expanding into new areas. The deployment of new staff is essential to ensure quality of operations and food security analysis and programme design relevant to the local context, which would otherwise not be assumed by new partners in the initial expansion phase.

27. Within each of three Darfur Area Offices one specialized programme teams will be responsible for working with partner NGOs on needs assessment, capacity building, monitoring and analysis and will support a continued successful implementation of the Food Security Monitoring System. Each team will consist of an international vulnerability analysis mapping (VAM) officer with two national officers, working with enumerators contracted by the new cooperating partners.
28. An additional five teams, each comprising one programme assistant and three food aid monitors, will directly support monitoring activities in each area where WFP has a stronger direct implementation role for distributions or where there is a stronger need to support partners expanding to new areas.
29. One international nutritionist will provide specific support to partner NGOs for expanded coverage of supplementary feeding programmes in areas no longer covered by departing NGOs.
30. This staff contingent is required to partially compensate for the limited scale-up capacity of existing NGOs. By working together with NGOs, they will also provide on the job training and capacity building and will facilitate the gradual takeover of programme activities by partners.

Operational contingency:

31. By augmenting its operational presence and building on existing capacity in Darfur, WFP will be able to maintain an adequate level of assistance with the necessary degree of accountability should additional NGOs suspend their programmes in Darfur and if some areas affected by the current situation cannot eventually be covered by other NGOs.
32. Potential risks involved in the implementation of this project as well as proposed mitigation solutions are outlined below:

No	Risks	Mitigation
A	Increased insecurity	Deployment of two additional field security officers for increased field support, monitoring of threats and mitigation of risk
B	Bureaucratic impediments and custom clearance delays	Ongoing / increased advocacy with Government; when required and possible, purchase of locally available equipment
C	Lack of substantial upfront contributions in the starting phase of the project	Local fundraising effort and identification of new donors
C	Delay in supply of construction material and equipment	Every effort will be made to fast-track early procurement and shipment of equipment
D	Delay in establishment of infrastructure due to lack of locally qualified companies	Recruitment of two full-time engineers to oversee the construction and where necessary hiring of Khartoum-based skilled site supervisors

33. The exit strategy for the special operation will be determined by the prevailing environment. Should the environment dictate a continued presence of United Nations agencies in the deep field, the new structures will be mainstreamed into WFP operations. Should the situation improve and allow for a safe and secure presence of NGOs in rural remote areas, including the implementation of recovery activities, the structures will be gradually handed over to NGOs and partners. A review will be carried out after one year from the start of the project to determine the exit strategy more appropriate to the evolving context.
34. A project manager will be recruited for the duration of the special operation and will report directly to the WFP Darfur Coordinator, who will also be the fund manager for the special operation.

Project Cost and Benefits

35. This special operation has a total cost of **US\$ 27,322,864** and is expected to provide the necessary equipment, staff, systems and facilities necessary to re-establish a stable, strong and safe field presence in Darfur for WFP and its NGO partners.
36. Below is the special operation's budget structure. Substantial upfront contributions will be required to enable the start-up of the project. Details can be found in the attached budget sheet:

DSC	11,511,710
DOC	14,023,677
ISC (7%)	1,787,477

Benefits:

37. The provision of additional operational support will facilitate the uninterrupted supply of food aid to the most affected population and reinstate quality food assistance programmes in Darfur.
38. The provision of additional support will ensure sustained and quality monitoring of food distributions and a more context-specific food security analysis for programme design, in line with the DFSLA 2008 recommendations and with WFP's strategy for 2009. Programme quality, accountable monitoring and context-specific assessment and targeting would not indeed be provided by NGOs expanding into large new areas where they had no previous presence. A stronger operational setup will also ensure continued implementation of the Food Security Monitoring System, which is central to adapt WFP's strategy to the evolving environment in Darfur.
39. Additional operational support will also sustain the expansion of Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programmes.

40. The establishment of additional facilities will support a sustained and stable field presence and access to rural, underserved locations, which is essential to accountable and effective humanitarian programmes. They can also be a launch pad for more early recovery activities in rural areas when circumstances permit.
41. A strengthened field presence will facilitate quality interventions and help build solid relationships with local communities, which would not otherwise be possible with one-off helicopter visits. It will help sustaining the frequency of assessments in remote areas, resulting in a stronger understanding of issues facing rural populations and an improved quality of sustained follow-up interventions.
42. While this special operation caters for the operational augmentation of WFP and NGO partners in support of EMOP 10760.0, the equipment and assets mobilized could also benefit other United Nations agencies and NGOs as required, that upon request could use the new office and guesthouse facilities, to support humanitarian presence in underserved areas. It is indeed expected that the availability of MOSS compliant offices and guesthouses will attract other humanitarian agencies and partners, with a positive impact on food security and other sectors.

Monitoring & Evaluation

43. The following indicators will be recorded and reported at the end of the project:
 - Time framework compliance with phased approach
 - Number of office and accommodation facilities available to WFP and partners versus six planned
 - Number of new NGOs premises supported in the start-up phase for expansion to new areas versus six planned
 - Number of staff lodged/working out of new office and accommodation facilities
 - Number of new partners' projects directly supported through WFP staff
 - Number of WFP staff versus planned working with Partners for capacity building
 - Percentage of affected locations where assessment, monitoring and targeting activities have resumed
44. Since this operation aims at ensuring the uninterrupted supply of food aid to the most remote areas in Darfur, a number of indicators relevant to EMOP 10760.0 can be used to provide an indirect indication on the overall quality and performance of this special operation. These indicators include:
 - Actual beneficiaries receiving WFP food assistance through GFD as a percentage of planned beneficiaries
 - Timeliness of monthly food distributions
 - Actual mt of food distributed as a percentage of planned distributions, by activity and commodity type.

- Number of joint assessments conducted by WFP and cooperating partners.
- Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under-5 in WFP intervention area

45. A compliance and cost effectiveness mission will be conducted by the end of the operation.

46. Operational reports will be provided on a regular basis.

RECOMMENDATION

This special operation covering the period from May 2009 to November 2010 at a total cost to WFP of US\$ 27,322,864 is recommended for approval by the Executive Director with the budget provided.

APPROVAL

Josette Sheeran
Executive Director, WFP

Date

Annexes:

- Project budget plan
- Maps