Executive Summary

Over the past 8 years, the humanitarian community in Somalia has responded to three major crises (2005-2006, 2008-2009 and 2011) with the most severe emergency leading to the declaration of Famine in July 2011. However, over the past 10 years, the pastoral, agro-pastoral and agricultural livelihoods within Somalia have fluctuated between Famine/Emergency/Crisis and Food Secure/Stressed. As a result of a combination of shocks such as poor rainfall, global price fluctuations and eruption of resourced-based or regional inter-state conflict, between 3.4 and 6.5 million Somalis have, to some degree, lost their assets and remained food-insecure.

With the support of the global Food Security Cluster the existing Somalia Food Assistance Cluster and Somalia Agricultural Livelihoods Cluster under the leadership of WFP and FAO (respectively) merged to form a single Somalia Food Security Cluster in March 2012. The overall goal of the Somalia FSC is to be the primary source of information on the ongoing humanitarian response addressing food insecurity and facilitate the development of a strategic vision and guidance for its members in their food security responses to the acute and underlying causes of the recurrent crisis in Somalia. This challenges the Food Security Cluster to look at providing guidance to its membership from a multi-year perspective on how member responses must address the acute seasonal needs for improved access to food as well as address livelihood vulnerability through activities that build resilience and provision of regular and dependable safety nets to begin to arrest the seasonal changes between Famine/Emergency/Crisis and Stressed. This Special Operation is to provide the Food Security Cluster with the resources to assume the leadership around the coordination and information management of food security related activities to strengthen partners’ responses within Somalia.

Project Background

1. In 2010 and 2011 two consecutive poor rainy seasons severely impacted populations in the Horn of Africa. The consecutive failed rains in Somalia led to widespread crop failure and a lack of adequate pastureland causing people
depending on agrarian, agro-pastoral and pastoral livelihoods to lose their main source of food and income. The protracted intra-state conflict affecting the majority of southern Somalia severely constrained humanitarian access and resulted in over 4 million Somalis urgently in need of life and livelihood saving responses.

2. On 20th July 2011, the United Nations, based on the findings of nutrition and mortality assessments in southern and central Somalia, declared famine\(^1\) in two regions of southern Somalia. On the 3rd August, the famine threshold was passed in three additional regions. The declaration led to a large and substantial humanitarian operation focusing on providing immediate access to food via food, cash and food vouchers for the Somali populations in *Famine/Emergency* and *Crisis*\(^2\); and where possible, livelihood responses that focused on providing livelihoods inputs such as high yielding variety seeds, fertiliser, hand tools, and where appropriate, vouchers for tractor use and fuel for irrigation pumps. In October 2011, due to the large humanitarian intervention, three of the five regions were no longer designated as being in a state of famine. In January 2012, the food security situation in Somalia further improved, with the number of people in crisis declining from over 4 million to 2.5 million. The 4 million Somalis in crisis, of which 750,000 were in famine, are still acutely vulnerable and the temporary improvement in their food security status remains fragile. The current outlook for the main production season for 2012 is still unclear; and it is predicted that the long rains (Gu rains) will be below normal leading to the possibility of a poor harvest and a potential increase of the population in *Emergency/Crisis*.

3. As highlighted in Annexes 1 and 2, over the past 10 years, the pastoral, agro-pastoral and agricultural livelihoods within Somalia have fluctuated between *Famine/Emergency/Crisis* and *Generally Food Secure/Stressed* including three major crises. Between 3.4 and 6.5 million\(^3\) Somalis, have, to some degree, remained food insecure between 2005 and 2011 causing livelihood asset erosion and heightened vulnerability to covariate shocks such as poor rainfall, global price fluctuations and eruption of resource based or regional inter-state conflict.

4. In December 2010, the global Food Security Cluster (gFSC) was endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). On the 1st of March 2012, the existing Somalia Food Assistance and Somalia Agricultural Livelihoods Clusters under the leadership of WFP and FAO (respectively), and with support from the gFSC merged to form a single Somalia Food Security Cluster (FSC). Prior to the merger the individual clusters sought to coordinate food access or livelihood strengthening responses in both emergency and recovery phases throughout Somalia. However, the division between the two clusters meant that integrating

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\(^1\) According to the Integrated Phase Classification, the following three conditions must exist as a minimum requirement for “famine” – and these outcomes must affect at least 20 percent of an area’s population: i) Food access far below 2,100 kilocalories of food per day; ii) Acute malnutrition in more than 30 percent of children; and iii) Crude Mortality Rate exceeds 2 per 10,000 people every day. Additional criteria can include epidemic illness; access to less than four liters of water every day; large-scale displacement of people; civil strife; and complete loss of assets and source of income.

\(^2\) This document uses the new IPC v2.0 nomenclature to describe the IPC Phases. For reference, Emergency is the new Humanitarian Emergency (red), Crisis is the new Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis (orange) and Stressed is the new Borderline Food Insecure (yellow).

\(^3\) This figure does not include the 2011 Post Gu Assessment with the declaration of Famine and over 4 million Somalis in crisis.
cluster member responses to concurrently respond to improving household access to food and strengthen livelihoods were limited.

5. The overall goal of the Somalia FSC is to be the primary source of information on the ongoing humanitarian response to address food insecurity and facilitate the development of a strategic vision. This requires the FSC to broaden the response guidance and vision of the cluster beyond the next seasonal assessment or annual CAP; and challenges the FSC leadership to look at developing guidance with its membership to look at humanitarian responses from a multi-year perspective which address the acute seasonal needs for improved access to food and livelihood support as well as address the livelihood vulnerability through activities that strengthen household and community resilience\(^4\) and protect vulnerable households with regular and dependable safety nets\(^5\). Currently the FSC’s members include 6 United Nations agencies, 40 International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) and just over 80 Local Non-governmental Organisations (LNGOs) with varying degrees of capacity.

6. The structure of the FSC, based on the recommendations from the gFSC led consultations in January 2012, is designed to have the participation of its diverse membership woven throughout structure of the cluster and to have a cluster secretariat which will be staffed by a small team of professionals with specific responsibilities. The broad structure of the cluster is presented in Annex 3, specific Terms of Reference (ToRs) for the various professional and voluntary positions is included in Annex 4 and a map outlining the current FSC regional coordination cells within Somalia is presented in Annex 5. As the cluster structure and ToRs outline, WFP and FAO, as lead agencies retain the overall responsibility for the activities of the cluster. The representatives of the lead agencies will be assisted by a Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) which will be composed of a combination of elected and nominated United Nations agencies, International Organisations, INGOs, and LNGOs. Currently, the FSC does not anticipate the participation of government in the SAG as strategic engagement with government\(^6\), is via the Inter-Cluster Working Group (ICWG) and Humanitarian County Team (HCT). The FSC Secretariat will report monthly on the cluster’s achievement of the six strategic priorities and in coordination with the SAG ensure that the cluster is providing the strategic vision and leadership it is mandated to provide. The FSC Secretariat will be responsible for overseeing effective local level cluster coordination and the productive engagement of the existing and adhoc technical working groups.

**Project Justification**

\(^4\) The FSC draws from the definition given in the tri-agency strategy to define resilience. Thus, *resilience* is defined as the ability of a system to anticipate, resist and/or recover from stresses or shocks in ways that preserve integrity and do not deepen vulnerability. This includes both the ability to withstand threats and the ability to adapt to new options if necessary.

\(^5\) Embedded in strategic thinking behind the FSC’s approach to providing guidance and technical standards to its membership will be the FAO – WFP – UNICEF Joint Strategy on building resilience against shocks for Somalia entitled “Building Resilience – rethinking aid strategy for Somalia”

\(^6\) Currently there are 3 semiautonomous governments and multiple militias which would need to accommodated in some may making the inclusion of these bodies into the strategic leadership of the SAG impossible
7. As highlighted in Annexes 1 and 2, Somalia has faced recurrent food security crisis in the past 10 years, including a famine in 2011. The merger of the Food Assistance Cluster and Agricultural Livelihoods Cluster lays the groundwork for the humanitarian community under the leadership of FAO and WFP to reorient the respective clusters to address acute needs; and to develop a multi-year vision to address both the acute needs and invest in activities that strengthen resilience to reduce the vulnerability of future generations.

8. Based on a series of consultations with key stakeholders, led by the gFSC, six strategic priorities were identified for the Somalia FSC to take a leadership role to facilitate the transition of humanitarian responses from a seasonal approach to a multiyear response addressing both acute needs and livelihood investment. The six priorities for the FSC are: i) Coordination of responses and strategic response guidance; ii) Reporting, monitoring and gaps identification; iii) Emergency preparedness and contingency planning; iv) Development and application of technical standards, and collecting and disseminating best practices; v) Advocacy and resource mobilization; vi) Strengthen the capacity of humanitarian actors.

9. Throughout this project the Food Security Cluster will work closely, through the Inter Cluster Working Group (ICWG), with other clusters and their lead agencies. Particular attention will be given to looking for joint response opportunities between the WASH and Nutrition Clusters under the leadership of UNICEF to ensure a more holistic food security response. The primary sources of food security information for the FSC to determine the response targets its members should work towards achieving are the seasonal FSNAU assessment and, as required, WFP VAM assessments, to deepen the understanding of food insecurity in particular areas. To ensure that the FSC is apprised of developments in the global humanitarian coordination architecture, the FSC will meet monthly with the gFSC via teleconferencing facilities.

**Project Objectives**

10. This Special Operation will provide the resources to allow the cluster to

   a. assume the leadership around the coordination and information management of food security related activities;

   b. provide guidance and strategic vision to its membership to respond to the acute needs, and;

   c. lay the foundations of recovery through strategic coordination guidance on livelihood planning that strengthen resilience to address the underlying causes of the year on year crisis in Somalia.

**Project Implementation**

11. This Special Operation will have duration of twelve months. The operation will be adapted and revised as the situation unfolds and further assessment results become available, including the possible inclusion of new activities or strategic priorities as required.
12. During the lifespan of this operation, the FSC, under the leadership of WFP and FAO, will strive to accomplish the various activities described below under the six strategic priorities of the FSC.

a. **Coordination of responses and development of strategic response guidance**: Through the different national and field level coordination mechanisms, the FSC Secretariat will engage with the FSC members to facilitate a coordinated response among the FSC members implementing responses that address both acute and livelihood needs. Through a peer development process, the FSC will coordinate the development of a response strategy that will support its members to develop humanitarian responses that are better nuanced to address the acute and livelihood investment needs of the different food insecure populations as identified by the IPC. This guidance will be incorporated into the criteria for the FSC to recommend projects for funding allocations such as the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) and other adhoc contributions from donors.

b. **Reporting, monitoring and gaps identification**: Employing the actual and planned location specific operation information provided by the cluster members, operational reports and field monitoring reports, the FSC will provide an analysis at the regional and national level of the current cluster responses, vis-à-vis the different food security needs of the populations in Crisis/Emergency/Famine and Stressed, according to the FSC’s response guidance and best practices.

c. **Emergency preparedness and contingency planning**: Using the local level coordination cells and the Nairobi secretariat and based on the most likely scenarios over six months, the FSC will follow the annual Gu and Deyr assessments. The cluster will seek to develop regional level contingency and response plans that will be published on the FSC webpage.

d. **Development and application of technical standards, and collecting and disseminating best practices**: Through the FSC technical working groups, technical questions posed by the cluster membership or technical gaps identified by the cluster or humanitarian community in general, will be explored and thematic guidance elaborated by the working groups. Technical guidance will focus on providing minimum standards which the FSC will encourage it members to respect when designing and implementing food security responses. The technical guidance will be reviewed by the cluster and endorsed by the SAG. The cluster will also work with its membership to identify best practices on how to design, implement, monitor, report and evaluate specific food security responses. These best practices will be thematically based, geographically focused, and livelihood specific. The endorsed technical guidance and best practices will be made available via the FSC webpage. Examples the types of training the FSC Secretariat are currently exploring, based on the requests of the cluster members are: the use of e-cash, developing a cogent project proposal within the OCHA OPS system.
e. **Advocacy and resource mobilization:** Drawing upon the outputs associated with strategic priorities a through c, the FSC will be in a position to inform the broader humanitarian community of the current and forecasted level of food security response needs throughout Somalia and the impact of funding shortfalls on the cluster’s overall response and on the food security outcomes (measured by the IPC). The information will be circulated by response briefs and bulletins, presentations to the FSC membership and informal and formal donor consultations as requested. Opportunities to link FSC members with likeminded donors will be sought.

f. **Strengthen the capacity of humanitarian actors:** The FSC is composed of over 130 agencies of which almost two thirds are Somali NGOs based within Somalia with representation in Nairobi. With increasing access restrictions, more and more INGOs and United Nations Agencies are relying on their ‘local partners’ to implement their programmes. With the FSC’s prioritization of integrating acute food access and livelihood investment responses, where appropriate, capacity building will be provided for INGOs, United Nations agency members and LNGOs. Based on a capacity needs identification exercise, the FSC will hold a series of trainings, throughout Somalia. The training themes to be explored, which can be drawn from the existing technical knowledge of the cluster lead agencies and technical working groups, are: Project Cycle Management, IPC and Needs Identification, Integrating Resilience Objectives with Seasonal Livelihood Investment Programming, Targeting and Seasonal Programming, Monitoring and Reporting and integrating protection mechanisms in to project design.

### Project Management

13. The Country Director of the WFP Somalia Country Office will be the fund manager for this Special Operation and the Somalia Finance Officer will be the Allotment Manager. The Representatives of WFP and FAO, as the co-leads of the FSC, have agreed that SO 200440 will be the sole funding document for the implementation of the Somalia FSC. There is also agreement that both WFP and FAO will jointly raise resources for this SO. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two agencies will act as the foundation for the use of the contributions to cover the costs of the FSCs activities, irrespective of agency. The Food Security Cluster Co-coordinators will be responsible for the implementation of the activities to achieve the strategic priorities. As highlighted in Annex 5 of the SO, the role of the FSC co-leads is to facilitate the cluster process at the national level. The FSC Co-coordinators meet on a regular basis with the cluster leads to agree on the planned and on-going cluster activities.

### Risk Assessment and Mitigation

14. The dynamic and complex environment creates numerous challenges when operating within Somalia. The FSC, in order to address the key risks outlined below, will undertake the following mitigation activities:

**Contextual Risks:**
• Lack of access for staff due to heightening insecurity and/or limited capacity of UNDSS approved accommodation;
• LNGO regulation issues resulting in licensing delays or refusals of FSC members.

These risks will be mitigated through:
• Creating a FSC secretariat that draws from international/national staff and local NGO volunteers for regional coordination position in areas where United Nations access is limited;
• Sending any new request for frequencies to the Government before project start date; and
• Requesting the HC/RC to intervene or resolve issues with the appropriate authorities on behalf of FSC if government NGO licensing requirement impede NGOs from becoming active members of the FSC.

Programmatic Risks:
• Food security humanitarian actors not willing to coordinate and share information on actual and planned operations leading to potential over support to affected populations

These risks will be mitigated through:
• Regular and informative cluster meetings in the field and nationally to ensure the FSC is capturing and reporting on all food security related activities and comparing this against the estimated caseloads from the regular FSNAU assessment.
• Regular donor briefing with the Nairobi based donor community highlighting the current level of coordination with FSC members and challenges with organisations that restrict their coordination with the FSC
• Participating and engaging in broader coordination forums to raise awareness of the value added services provided by the FSC to humanitarian agencies responding to food insecurity within Somalia.

Institutional Risks:
• Constraints to the United Nations humanitarian efforts affecting the engagement of non-governmental and international organisations in the cluster coordination system

This risk will be mitigated through:
• Engagement of local and regional NGOs as much as possible to reinforce the inclusive nature of the FSC.

Exit Strategy

15. It is anticipated that this Special Operation will come to an end in August 2013. The indicator for the closure of the SO will be a request by the HC/HCT to
transform the FSC into a working group due to a substantial stabilisation of the food security situation in Somalia. If, at the end of the third quarter of the SO’s lifespan, the FSC is not requested to transform into a working group, a consultative evaluation, led by the gFSC, of the FSC will be undertaken. This will include a reflection of the FSC strategic priorities vis-à-vis the membership’s needs and will act as the foundation for revising the activities and lead to the development of either a budget revision of the present SO or a new SO from the third quarter of 2013 and beyond.

Project Cost and Benefits

16. The total costs of the project will be US$ 2,816,717

17. This Special Operation will provide the resources for the nascent Somalia FSC to be the primary source of information on the on-going humanitarian response to address food insecurity and provide a strategic vision and guidance for its membership. The outcomes of the FSC’s efforts will be seen in i) Better coordinated operations that seek to address the immediate food security needs of populations in Famine/Emergency/Crisis but also lay the foundation, through best practices and technical guidance, for the development of resilience of future generations of Somalis against recurring co-variant shocks; ii) A better informed humanitarian community on the on-going and planned food security responses, forecasted gaps, funding constraints, and contingency/response plans against the most likely scenarios; iii) A more coordinated and informed FSC membership able to more effectively and efficiently implement multi-layered food security responses. The FSC will make every effort to ensure a balanced approach to the implementation of the six priorities, if funding levels do not make this possible, the FSC will prioritise priorities a, b, c, and f.

Monitoring & Evaluation

18. As indicated above, the FSC will conduct a detailed lessons learned consultative evaluation, led by the gFSC to review the FSC strategic priorities vis-à-vis the FSC membership’s needs. These reflections, lessons learned and best practices can be compiled and carried over to future operations as well as become normative guidance for FSCs globally. In addition with potential rollout of the Cluster Performance Monitoring in the fourth quarter of 2012, feedback from regular monitoring, every six months, will be used to improve cluster performance.

19. Key Performance Indicators for this Special Operation will be:

- Number of agencies as subscribed and participating in the cluster system nationally (Target: 130); Number of regional cluster coordination cells created (Target: 9)
- Number of bulletins, response scenarios, contingency plans, response/gap maps and analysis, humanitarian briefs, and other advocacy documents produced and circulated (Target: 100)
• Number of capacity development training implement by the cluster (Target: 40); and number of cluster members successfully completed the training (Target: 600)
• Number of technical guidelines prepared by the FSC working groups, endorsed by the FSC’s Strategic Advisory Group (SAG), and shared with the cluster membership (Target: 10); Number of best practices captured and circulated to members (Target: 5)

RECOMMENDATION
This Special Operation covering period from 01st September 2012 to 31st August 2013 at a total cost of US$2,816,717 is recommended for approval by the Deputy Executive Director for Operations.

APPROVAL

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Ramiro Lopes da Silva
Deputy Executive Director for Operations